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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, FEDERALISM, AND 
THE NATIONAL BATTLE OVER BATHROOM 
ACCESS* 
SCOTT W. GAYLORD** & THOMAS J. MOLONY*** 
As Justice Brandeis famously explained, under our federal 
system, states are laboratories for testing “novel social and 
economic experiments.” These laboratories, however, must 
operate within constitutional limits. Under the Constitution, 
certain individual rights are sacrosanct and valid federal laws 
reign supreme. Accordingly, when a state implements a 
previously untested social policy—such as prohibiting local 
governments from adopting ordinances that would dictate 
restroom policies for private businesses and expressly limiting 
access to public restrooms based on biological sex—the question 
arises whether the experiment has gone too far. 
 
When North Carolina enacted legislation that set off a national 
debate over bathroom access, individuals, various media outlets, 
and the United States Departments of Justice and Education 
emphatically stated that the answer is “yes.” Members of the 
LGBT community charged North Carolina with violating their 
rights to equal protection. And in a May 2016 Dear Colleague 
letter, the Departments announced a national policy regarding 
restrooms, informing states that they must allow students in 
public schools to use bathrooms consistent with the students’ 
expressed gender identities or risk losing all Title IX funding. 
Not surprisingly, given the importance of the issue, as well as the 
threatened loss of billions of dollars in federal funding, the 
Departments and numerous states filed competing lawsuits 
pitting the federal government against twenty-four states in 
multiple federal lawsuits. To date, federal courts have resolved 
the complex and novel claims with respect to public bathroom 
access in inconsistent ways, with the Fourth Circuit deferring to 
the Departments’ interpretation of Title IX’s requirements and a 
Texas district court issuing a nationwide injunction precluding 
enforcement of that interpretation. 
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Yet no federal court has reached the issue that the United States 
Supreme Court ultimately may need to decide—whether the 
Constitution permits states to decide how to resolve highly 
personal and controversial issues such as bathroom access. The 
issue is of critical national importance given the tension it creates 
between the individual liberties secured under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the principles undergirding our federal system. 
This Article contends that, within our system of shared 
governance, states have broad authority to try different 
approaches when addressing such significant policy issues 
because (1) laws that regulate bathroom usage based on 
biological sex and facially neutral laws that do not extend special 
protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity do not violate the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the Departments lack the 
authority under the spending clause to impose a national policy 
for bathroom access. While not taking any position as to the 
policy that states should adopt, this Article carefully analyzes the 
central underlying constitutional claims in the lawsuits that North 
Carolina’s controversial legislation spawned and concludes, 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Schuette 
v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, that “[o]ur 
constitutional system embraces .	.	. the right of citizens to debate 
so they can learn and decide and then, through the political 
process, act in concert to try to shape the course of their own 
times and the course of a nation that must strive always to make 
freedom ever greater and more secure.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
It takes only a spark to start a constitutional firestorm. A short, 
five-page ordinance adopted by Charlotte, North Carolina’s city 
council ignited what would soon become a nationwide debate about 
bathroom access, LGBT rights, privacy rights, and whether the 
federal government or the states have the authority to set policy in 
this important and sensitive area. In response to Charlotte’s 
ordinance, the North Carolina General Assembly passed the Public 
Facilities Privacy & Security Act, commonly referred to as “H.B.	2,” 
mandating that public restrooms be separated based on biological sex 
and precluding local governments from passing public 
accommodations ordinances.1 Members of the LGBT community and 
the American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina (“ACLU-
NC”) immediately sued in federal court, and less than two months 
later, the United States Departments of Justice and Education (the 
“Departments”) informed North Carolina2—and public schools 
 
 1. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, ch. 3, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 12, repealed 
by Act to Reset, ch. 4, sec. 1, 2017-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 16 (LexisNexis). 
 2. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Carcaño v. McCrory, No. 1:16-
cv-236 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2016); Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Pat McCrory, Governor, State of N.C. (May 4, 
2016) [hereinafter DOJ Letter to McCrory], http://media.charlotteobserver.com/static
/images/misc/HB2050412.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8NR-3X8Q]; Letter from Vanita Gupta, 
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across the country3—that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972 requires states to allow students to use public restrooms 
consistent with the students’ expressed gender identities. More 
litigation quickly followed, with the federal government squaring off 
against twenty-four states in various federal lawsuits.4 
As the litigation following H.B.	2’s enactment demonstrates, the 
battle over bathroom access raises important constitutional questions 
not just about LGBT rights, but also regarding individual rights more 
broadly and the relationship between sovereigns in our federal 
system. Not surprisingly, given the complexity and novelty of these 
issues, federal courts have reached conflicting decisions regarding 
who gets to set the rules for public-school restrooms. The Fourth 
Circuit deferred to the Departments’ interpretation of sex 
discrimination under Title IX5 while a federal district court in Texas 
issued a nationwide injunction against the Departments that 
precluded enforcement of their interpretation.6 Given the significant 
constitutional issues raised and the uncertainty as to the proper 
 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Frank L. Perry, Sec’y 
of Pub. Safety, N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety (May 4, 2016) [hereinafter DOJ Letter to Perry], 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/2016.05.04DPSFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc
/76KN-ZXVB]; Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Margaret Spellings, President, Univ. of N.C., et al. (May 4, 2016) 
[hereinafter DOJ Letter to Spellings], http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article75647942.ece/BINARY/Read:%20DOJ%20letter%20to%20UNC 
[https://perma.cc/QL9M-X932] . 
 3. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Opinion Letter on Transgender 
Students (May 13, 2016), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GYC-S626]. 
 4. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18–33, Nebraska v. United 
States, No. 4:16-cv-03117-JMG-CRZ (D. Neb. July 8, 2016) (including claims by Nebraska, 
Arkansas, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Wyoming, 
and Michigan’s Attorney General); Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief at 5, Texas v. United States, Civil Action No. 7:16-cv-00054-O (N.D. 
Tex. June 15, 2016) (including claims by Texas, Alabama, Wisconsin, West Virginia, 
Tennessee, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Utah, Georgia, the Governor of Maine, the Arizona 
Department of Education, Mississippi, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky as plaintiffs); 
Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 19–38, Berger v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:16-cv-
00844-TDS-JEP (E.D.N.C. May 9, 2016) (describing claims of the President Pro Tempore 
of the North Carolina Senate and the Speaker of the North Carolina House of 
Representatives); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 8–9, McCrory v. United States, 
No. 5:16-cv-00238-BO (E.D.N.C. May 9, 2016) (describing requests for declaratory 
judgment); Complaint at 11–13, United States v. North Carolina, No. 1:16-cv-00425 
(M.D.N.C. May 9, 2016) (alleging violations of Title VII, Title IX, and VAWA and 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief). 
 5. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 721–23 (4th Cir. 
2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.). 
 6. Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 815 (N.D. Tex. 2016), order clarified 
by Order, No. 7:16-cv-00054-0, 2016 WL 7852331 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2016). 
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constitutional standard to apply, the Supreme Court ultimately may 
need to resolve the conflict.7 
This Article explores the interplay between individual liberties 
secured under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution and the right of the citizens of the several states (through 
their state legislatures) to shape policy regarding important and 
sometimes controversial issues, such as bathroom access. Part I 
explains H.B.	2 and the Charlotte ordinance that gave rise to the law. 
Part I also discusses the lawsuits that ensued after H.B.	2’s passage, 
identifying the central questions those lawsuits posed in regard to 
federalism and individual rights. Part II analyzes the equal protection 
claims regarding H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations 
provisions, which bar local governments from granting protection 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity, and the law’s provisions addressing public-bathroom access. 
Part III then considers the federalism concerns raised by the 
Departments’ interpretation of federal law as requiring that 
transgender individuals be permitted to use restrooms and changing 
facilities consistent with their gender identities. In particular, Part III 
examines whether the federal government has the power under the 
spending clause to withhold federal funding from states that refuse to 
comply with the Departments’ directives. 
Finally, this Article concludes that the Constitution neither 
allows the federal government to force its policy objectives on states 
nor confers equal protection rights that preclude states from making 
the ultimate policy choices in this area. As the United States Supreme 
Court recently explained in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action,8 claims of individual rights sometimes must yield 
to the democratic process: 
The freedom secured by the Constitution consists, in one of its 
essential dimensions, of the right of the individual not to be 
injured by the unlawful exercise of governmental power.	.	.	. 
 
 7. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari with respect to the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in G.G. ex rel. Grimm and ordered a stay in the case pending the Court’s 
ultimate judgment. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) 
(mem.). After the Departments withdrew their earlier interpretation of Title IX, however, 
the Court remanded the case for further consideration. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. 
ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.); see also U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Opinion Letter on Withdrawal of Title IX Guidance Documents 1–2 (Feb. 22, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/941551/download [https://perma.cc
/Z34F-QUD6] (withdrawing previous Title IX interpretation). 
 8. Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & 
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
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Yet freedom does not stop with individual rights. Our 
constitutional system embraces, too, the right of citizens to 
debate so they can learn and decide and then, through the 
political process, act in concert to try to shape the course of 
their own times and the course of a nation that must strive 
always to make freedom ever greater and more secure.	.	.	. 
[D]emocracy has the capacity—and the duty—to learn from its 
past mistakes; to discover and confront persisting biases; and by 
respectful, rational[] deliberation to rise above those flaws and 
injustices.	.	.	. It is demeaning to the democratic process to 
presume that the voters are not capable of deciding an issue of 
.	.	. sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.	.	.	. Freedom 
embraces the right, indeed the duty, to engage in a rational, 
civic discourse in order to determine how best to form a 
consensus to shape the destiny of the Nation and its people.9 
Thus, Americans should continue to debate the wisdom and 
merits of bathroom-access legislation and restricting non-
discrimination protections to certain classes. Under the Constitution, 
states retain the right to decide such issues for themselves, with their 
citizens making the ultimate policy choices in the voting booth. 
I. FROM NORTH CAROLINA TO THE NATION 
The most recent battle over LGBT rights began in North 
Carolina’s largest city.10 On February 22, 2016, after more than two 
decades of vigorous debate,11 the Charlotte City Council voted 7-4 in 
favor of an ordinance (the “Charlotte Ordinance”) to add “sex, 
marital status, familial status, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
[and] gender expression” to the list of classifications included in 
existing City Code provisions aimed at preventing discrimination in 
 
 9. Id. at 1636–37. 
 10. Largest Cities in North Carolina, NCPEDIA (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ncpedia.org
/geography/cities [https://perma.cc/BZS9-QRWJ]. 
 11. See Steve Harrison, Charlotte City Council Approves LGBT Protections in 7-4 
Vote, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 22, 2016, 3:06 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com
/news/politics-government/article61786967.html [https://perma.cc/M8DD-NKYQ] (indicating 
that 140 people spoke at the 2016 council meeting and that the council chamber was filled 
to capacity); Ely Portillo & Mark Price, Charlotte LGBT Ordinance Fails 6-5 in 
Contentious Meeting, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 2, 2015, 10:17 AM), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article11908907.html [https://perma.cc
/2YA9-72CE] (indicating that Charlotte’s city council first considered a proposal to add 
“sexual orientation” to the city’s public accommodations law in 1992 and that 120 people 
asked to speak at a 2015 council meeting regarding a proposed ordinance similar to the 
one ultimately adopted). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1661 (2017) 
2017] INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND H.B.	2 1667 
public accommodations.12 That very same ordinance had been 
proposed and had failed by a narrow margin the year before.13 By 
February 2016, however, the citizens of Charlotte had elected two 
new city council members, and their votes made the difference.14 
The Charlotte Ordinance not only added new categories to the 
public accommodations provisions in the City Code, but also 
eliminated an existing exemption for “[r]estrooms, shower rooms, 
bathhouses and similar facilities” that applied to the city’s prohibition 
against sex discrimination.15 This change meant that private 
businesses would need to open their men’s rooms to women 
(regardless of whether they identified as men or not) and their 
women’s rooms to men (regardless of whether they identified as 
women or not). State leaders expressed outrage and concern about 
the public safety and privacy implications of forcing businesses to 
allow access to their restrooms in this way,16 and with the Charlotte 
 
 12. See Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 §§	1–4 (Feb. 22, 2016) (amending various 
provisions of the City Code); Harrison, supra note 11 (indicating that the ordinance was 
approved in a 7-4 vote). Under Charlotte’s city code, a public accommodation is “a 
business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation 
facility .	.	. available to the public.” CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES §	12-57 
(2016). Even before the City Council passed the new ordinance, the City Code had a 
provision prohibiting discrimination based on sex in public accommodations, but it only 
applied to hotels, motels, and restaurants. See CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§	12-59 (2016). Notably, the Charlotte Ordinance did not make any changes to the 
antidiscrimination provisions in the City Code applicable to housing or employment. See 
CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES §	6-59(b) (2016) (providing that “no person 
shall be discriminated against in employment by the grantee [of a cable communications 
franchise] because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, age, physical disability or 
marital status”); CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§	12-111, 12-114, 12-115 
(2016) (prohibiting discrimination based on various characteristics in real estate 
transactions and in providing real estate brokerage services); Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 
7056 (Feb. 22, 2016) (not including any amendments to the nondiscrimination provisions 
in CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§	6-59(b), 12-111, 12-114, 12-115 (2016)). 
 13. See City Council Agenda, CITY OF CHARLOTTE CITY COUNCIL 212–16 (Mar. 2, 
2015), http://charlottenc.gov/CityClerk/Agendas/March%202,%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc
/346Z-RSF6] (including the proposed 2015 ordinance); Portillo & Price, supra note 11 
(describing the vote by the City Council in 2015). 
 14. Harrison, supra note 11 (“A year ago, the ordinance failed in a 6-5 vote. But two 
new at-large members .	.	. were elected to the council in November, and both supported 
the ordinance.”). 
 15. See Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 §	3 (Feb. 22, 2016) (adding “sex” to the list of 
categories in the public accommodations provisions in CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES §	12-58 and eliminating CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES §	12-59 
in its entirety).  
 16. See Tal Kopan & Eugene Scott, North Carolina Governor Signs Controversial 
Transgender Bill, CNN (Mar. 24, 2016, 11:12 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/politics
/north-carolina-gender-bathrooms-bill/ [https://perma.cc/C6AF-5RF2] (quoting Speaker of 
the North Carolina House of Representatives Tim Moore as saying, “[t]he way the 
ordinance was written by City Council in Charlotte, it would have allowed a man to go 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1661 (2017) 
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Ordinance’s April 1, 2016 effective date looming,17 the North 
Carolina General Assembly held a special session18 and enacted 
H.B.	2.19 
H.B.	2 had several key features. First, it required multiple 
occupancy bathrooms and changing facilities in government buildings 
and public schools, including the University of North Carolina and 
the state’s community colleges, to be designated and used based on 
biological sex.20 Second, H.B.	2 preempted local employment 
discrimination measures (except employment practices of local 
governments with respect to their own employees) and amended the 
state’s employment discrimination statute so that the prohibition 
against sex discrimination was limited to discrimination based on 
“biological sex.”21 Finally, the law preempted local public 
 
into a bathroom, locker or any changing facility, where women are—even if he was a man. 
We were concerned. Obviously there is the security risk of a sexual predator, but there is 
the issue of privacy.”); Beau Minnick, Berger Calls Charlotte’s Ordinance on Bathrooms 
‘Crazy,’ WNCN (Mar. 3, 2016, 5:08 PM), http://wncn.com/2016/03/03/berger-calls-
charlottes-ordinance-on-bathrooms-crazy/ [https://perma.cc/PHX6-FSR4] (indicating that 
North Carolina legislative leaders were concerned with the Charlotte Ordinance’s impact 
on bathroom access); Matt Pearce, Conservatives Push Back on Transgender Bathroom 
Rights in North Carolina, L.A. TIMES, (Feb. 24, 2016, 3:00 AM) http://www.latimes.com
/nation/la-na-0224-transgender-battleground-20160224-story.html [https://perma.cc/2ESC-
62LS] (quoting North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory as saying, “[a]s governor, I will 
support legislative action to address this regulation and will remain committed to 
protecting the privacy and safety of all men, women and children of all ages in North 
Carolina”).  
 17. Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 §	5 (specifying April 1, 2016 as the effective date 
for the amendments to the City Code). 
 18. See Greg Lacour, HB2: How North Carolina Got Here (Updated), CHARLOTTE 
MAGAZINE (Mar. 30, 2017, 2:29 PM), http://www.charlottemagazine.com/Charlotte-
Magazine/April-2016/HB2-How-North-Carolina-Got-Here/ [https://perma.cc/UY94-
CKVB] (indicating that leaders of the North Carolina General Assembly called a special 
session for March 23, 2016 and that legislation responding to the Charlotte Ordinance was 
enacted that day). 
 19. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, ch. 3, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws (repealed 
2017). 
 20. Id., ch. 3, sec.	1.2, §	115C-521.2, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 13 (repealed 2017); id., ch. 
3, sec.	1.3, §	143-760, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 14 (repealed 2017). The new law defined 
“biological sex” as “[t]he physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a 
person’s birth certificate.” Id., ch. 3, sec.	1.2, §	115C-521.2(a)(1), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 
12 (repealed 2017); id., ch. 3, sec.	1.3, §	143-760(a)(1), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 13 (repealed 
2017). While these provisions applied more broadly to include changing facilities, for the 
sake of simplicity, they are referred to in this Article as the “bathroom provisions.” 
 21. Id., ch. 3,	sec.	3.1, §	143-422.2(a), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 15 (repealed 2017). See 
supra note 20 for an explanation of the meaning of “biological sex.” H.B.	2 also contained 
a number of other employment-related provisions. It prohibited cities and counties from 
conditioning eligibility to bid or be selected for a city or county contract based on the 
contractor’s employment practices. Id., ch. 3, sec. 2.2, §	153A-449(a), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 
at 14–15 (repealed 2017); id., ch. 3, sec.	2.3, §	160A-20.1(a), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 15 
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accommodations regulations and adopted a statewide measure that 
barred discrimination based on “race, religion, color, national origin, 
or biological sex” in public accommodations but allowed 
discrimination based on biological sex with respect to bathrooms and 
changing facilities.22 
On March 28, 2016, just five days after H.B.	2 became effective, 
members of the LGBT community and ACLU-NC filed a lawsuit 
challenging the law.23 In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs 
claimed that H.B.	2’s public accommodations and employment 
provisions violated the rights of LGBT persons under the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 They also raised a 
host of claims with respect to the law’s bathroom provisions, alleging 
that those provisions violated the rights of transgender individuals to 
equal protection, their rights to privacy, liberty, and autonomy under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, and the 
nondiscrimination provisions contained in Title IX.25 
A chorus demanding repeal arose quickly after North Carolina’s 
governor signed H.B.	2 into law,26 and in the wake of significant 
public backlash,27 the governor issued an executive order to confirm 
 
(repealed 2017). With an exception applicable to local government employees, H.B.	2 
barred local governments from regulating certain labor conditions, including 
compensation and benefits. Id., ch. 3, sec. 2.1, §	95-25.1, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 14 
(repealed 2017). And the law originally eliminated private causes of action for 
employment discrimination, id., ch. 3, sec. 3.2, §	143-422.3, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 15, but 
that provision later was repealed retroactively to the date of H.B.	2’s adoption. Act to 
Restore the State Tort Claim for Wrongful Discharge, ch. 99, sec. 1.(a), §	143-422.3, 2016 
N.C. Sess. Laws 570, 570, repealed by Act to Reset, ch. 4, sec. 1, 2017-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. 
Serv. 16 (LexisNexis). 
 22. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, ch. 3, sec.	3.3, §	143-422.11, 2016 N.C. 
Sess. Laws at 16. H.B.	2 also prohibited cities and counties from conditioning eligibility to 
bid or be selected for a city or county contract based on the contractor’s provision of 
goods, services or accommodations to the public. Id., ch. 3, sec.	2.2, §	153A-449(a), 2016 
N.C. Sess. Laws at 14–15; id., ch. 3, sec.	2.3, §	160A-20.1(a), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 15. 
 23. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 2. 
 24. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 47–49, 
Carcaño v. McCrory, No. 1:16-cv-00236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. Apr. 21, 2016) (describing 
the equal protection claim with respect to the public accommodations and employment 
provisions). 
 25. Id. at 44–47, 51–55 (describing the various claims related to H.B.	2’s bathroom 
provisions). 
 26. See Anne Blythe, North Carolina’s HB2 Challenge Could Play out in Two Courts, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 3, 2016, 5:43 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news
/local/article69752592.html [https://perma.cc/M7YX-N7G4] (noting that the Human Rights 
Campaign quickly “rallied 120 companies to sign a letter to [the governor] seeking repeal 
of the law”). 
 27. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, North Carolina Governor’s Misleading Claim About His 
Executive Order and the LGBT Law, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2016), 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1661 (2017) 
1670 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
the state’s commitment to inclusiveness and diversity.28 While the 
executive order extended new protection against discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and gender identity to state employees,29 the 
order otherwise did little more than explain H.B.	2, pointing out in 
particular that the law did not prevent private entities from adopting 
their own antidiscrimination policies or setting their own guidelines 
for the use of restrooms and changing facilities.30 
Not surprisingly, the executive order did little to quell the ire of 
H.B.	2’s opponents.31 The April 19, 2016 decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. 
Gloucester County School Board,32 however, emboldened them. In 
January 2015, the Department of Education began interpreting Title 
IX to require schools to allow transgender students to access 
restrooms and changing facilities consistent with their gender 
identities,33 and the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Department’s 
interpretation was “to be accorded controlling weight” when 
determining what Title IX demands.34 According to ACLU-NC, the 
“ruling ma[de] plain that [H.B.	2] violate[d] Title IX.”35 
And about two weeks after the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in G.G., 
the Department of Justice sent letters to North Carolina’s governor, 
its secretary of public safety, and representatives of the University of 




/EB6Z-VGCV] (stating that North Carolina’s governor issued his executive order “to 
assuage	the concerns of those who believed the law would legalize rampant 
discrimination”). 
 28. See N.C. Exec. Order No. 93, Preamble (Apr. 12, 2016) (Governor Pat McCrory’s 
order “To Protect Privacy and Equality”).  
 29. See id. §	2 (“I hereby affirm that the State of North Carolina is committed to 
administering and implementing all State human resources policies, practices and 
programs .	.	. without unlawful discrimination .	.	. on the basis of .	.	. sexual orientation [or] 
gender identity .	.	.	.”). 
 30. See id. §§	2, 3 (explaining that private businesses may adopt their own policies). 
 31. David A. Graham, North Carolina’s Nearly Meaningless Executive Order on 
Discrimination, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016
/04/pat-mccrory-north-carolina-hb2/477936/ [https://perma.cc/CF8G-64UG] (indicating that 
the ACLU-NC “quickly dismissed the [executive] order”). 
 32. 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.). 
 33. See id. at 715 (explaining the Department of Education’s interpretation of Title 
IX). 
 34. Id. at 723. 
 35. Anne Blythe, Appeals Court Rules for Transgender Teen in Virginia Bathroom 
Case, NEWS & OBSERVER (Apr. 19, 2016, 1:42 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news
/politics-government/state-politics/article72637592.html [https://perma.cc/A5GG-Y383] 
(quoting statement by ACLU-NC). 
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interpreted not only Title IX but also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act 
(“VAWA”) to require that transgender individuals be given access to 
restrooms and changing facilities consistent with their gender 
identities and that, therefore, compliance with H.B.	2 violated federal 
law.36 North Carolina’s governor and secretary of public safety, 
however, refused to acquiesce and instead responded with a lawsuit 
against the federal government seeking a declaration that H.B.	2 did 
not run afoul of either Title VII or VAWA.37 The same day, the 
Department of Justice filed its own lawsuit to force North Carolina to 
comply with federal law,38 and the leaders of both houses of the North 
Carolina General Assembly sued the Department, claiming that the 
Department’s interpretation of Title VII, Title IX, and VAWA 
violated the principles of separation of powers and federalism under 
the United States Constitution.39 A day later, an association of 
primary, secondary, and post-secondary school students and parents 
sued for a declaration that maintaining biological sex-specific 
restrooms and locker rooms does not violate either Title IX or 
VAWA.40 
The controversy, however, did not stop in North Carolina. It 
spread across the country when the Departments of Justice and 
Education published a “Dear Colleague” letter with “significant 
guidance” regarding compliance with Title IX on May 13, 2016.41 The 
letter stressed that 
[t]he Departments treat a student’s gender identity as the 
student’s sex for purposes of Title IX and its implementing 
regulations. This means that a school must not treat a 
transgender student differently from the way it treats other 
students of the same gender identity.	.	.	. Title IX’s 
implementing regulations permit a school to provide sex-
 
 36. See DOJ Letter to McCrory, supra note 2; DOJ Letter to Perry, supra note 2; 
DOJ Letter to Spellings, supra note 2. 
 37. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 4, at 8–9 (describing requests 
for declaratory judgment). 
 38. See Complaint, supra note 4, at 11–13 (alleging violations of Title VII, Title IX, 
and VAWA and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief). 
 39. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 19–38, Berger v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
No. 1:16-cv-00844-TDS-JEP (E.D.N.C. May 9, 2016) (describing claims of the President 
Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate and the Speaker of the North Carolina House 
of Representatives). 
 40. See Complaint at 48, North Carolinians for Privacy v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 
5:16-cv-00245-FL (E.D.N.C. May 10, 2016) (claiming violations of the Administrative 
Procedure Act and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief). 
 41. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3, at 1. 
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segregated restrooms, locker rooms, shower facilities, housing, 
and athletic teams, as well as single-sex classes under certain 
circumstances. When a school provides sex-segregated activities 
and facilities, transgender students must be allowed to 
participate in such activities and access such facilities consistent 
with their gender identity.42 
Texas, Alabama, Wisconsin, West Virginia, Tennessee, 
Oklahoma, Louisiana, Utah, Georgia, the Governor of Maine, the 
Arizona Department of Education, and school districts in Texas and 
Arizona responded on May 25, 2016 with yet another lawsuit and 
claimed that the Departments’ “significant guidance” violated the 
Constitution’s spending clause by forcing the states to accept the 
Departments’ new interpretation of Title IX and VAWA or risk 
losing significant federal education funding.43 Mississippi and 
Kentucky joined the Texas lawsuit in mid-June,44 and in July, 
Nebraska, Arkansas, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Wyoming, Michigan’s Attorney General, 
and the Arkansas Division of Youth Services filed a separate lawsuit 
with claims similar to those raised in the Texas action.45 Thus, in less 
than five months, Charlotte’s five-page ordinance had generated 
seven federal lawsuits involving not only private plaintiffs but also the 
federal government and twenty-four different states. 
Developments in the G.G. case in August kept the Departments’ 
guidance in the spotlight. On August 3, 2016, the United States 
Supreme Court stayed the injunction that followed the Fourth 
Circuit’s ruling,46 and in direct conflict with the G.G. decision, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas on 
August 21, 2016 issued a nationwide injunction to prevent the 
Departments from enforcing their interpretation of Title IX.47 By the 
 
 42. Id. at 2–3. 
 43. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 19–32, Texas v. United 
States, Civil Action No. 7:16-cv-00054-O (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2016) (asserting various 
claims regarding the guidance in the Departments’ May 2016 “Dear Colleague” letter and 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief). 
 44. See Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 4, at 5 (including the State of Mississippi and the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
as plaintiffs). 
 45. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4, at 18–33 
(asserting various claims regarding the guidance in the Departments’ May 2016 “Dear 
Colleague” letter and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief). 
 46. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S. Ct. 2442, 2442 (2016) 
(mem.) (granting stay). 
 47. Preliminary Injunction Order at 36–37, Texas v. United States, Civil Action No. 
7:16-cv-00054-O (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2016). 
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end of October, the Supreme Court had granted the Virginia school 
board’s petition for a writ of certiorari in G.G.48 
The election of Donald Trump, however, changed the landscape 
both for the G.G. case and the lawsuits between the federal 
government and the various states. In February 2017, about a month 
after President Trump’s inauguration, the Departments withdrew 
their earlier interpretation of Title IX, noting that the May 2016 
“Dear Colleague” letter did not “contain extensive legal analysis[,] .	.	. 
explain how the [interpretation was] consistent with the express 
language of Title IX, []or .	.	. undergo any formal public process.”49 As 
a result of this withdrawal, the Supreme Court remanded the G.G. 
case to the Fourth Circuit for further consideration,50 and in March 
2017, the states that had sued following publication of the May 2016 
letter called off their lawsuits.51 
March 2017 ushered in the demise of H.B.	2 as well. Amid 
mounting pressure from the NCAA,52 the North Carolina General 
Assembly repealed H.B.	2.53 With H.B.	2 off the books, the duel 
between North Carolina and the federal government came to an 
end.54 
 
 48. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (mem.) 
(granting certiorari to Questions 2 and 3 of the petition). 
 49. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 7, at 1. 
 50. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.) 
(vacating judgment and remanding the case back to the Fourth Circuit). 
 51. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1)(A)(i) at 2, Nebraska v. United States, No. 4:16-CV-03117 (D. Neb. Mar. 16, 
2017); Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) 
at 2–3, Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-cv-00054-O (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017). 
 52. Jim Morrill & Colin Campbell, NCAA Gives North Carolina a Deadline to Repeal 
HB2 or Lose Events Until 2022, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 23, 2017, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article140383638.html 
[https://perma.cc/73LY-RFCQ]. 
 53. Act to Reset, ch. 4, sec. 1, 2017-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 16, 16 (LexisNexis). 
 54. Joint Stipulated Notice of Dismissal at 1, United States v. North Carolina, No. 
1:16-CV-00425-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2017). The lawsuits brought by North 
Carolina’s governor and the leaders of the State’s General Assembly concluded earlier as 
the parties sought to litigate their various claims in the federal government’s lawsuit 
against the State, rather than in individual lawsuits. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary 
Dismissal Without Prejudice at 1–2, McCrory v. United States, No. 5:16-cv-238-BO 
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2016); Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Berger v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
at 1–2, No. 1:16-cv-00844-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. July 28, 2016). The lawsuit brought against 
the United States Department of Justice by the association of primary, secondary, and 
post-secondary school students and parents likewise was earlier dismissed. Notice of 
Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(a)(1)(A)(i) at 1–2, North Carolinians for Privacy v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:16-cv-
00845-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2016). 
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While the lawsuits between the federal government and the 
various states are gone, the federalism concerns the lawsuits raised 
are not; their resolution has just been put on hold until the executive 
branch again threatens to withhold funding from the states based on a 
novel interpretation of federal law. And despite H.B.	2’s repeal, the 
underlying controversy is not going away because the legislature did 
not effect a “clean” repeal of the law. Instead, the repeal reserved to 
the state the right to regulate access to restrooms and changing 
facilities and barred local governments from enacting or amending 
ordinances that regulate private employment practices or public 
accommodations until December 2020.55 Consequently, ACLU-NC 
has shifted its sights to the repeal bill,56 which—at least until the end 
of 2020—continues to prohibit what Charlotte had tried to achieve in 
its ordinance and therefore raises some of the same equal protection 
issues that H.B.	2 raised.57 Thus, the nation’s eyes are sure to remain 
on North Carolina, the place where the bathroom bill began. 
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO H.B.	2 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that 
“[n]o State shall .	.	. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”58 Simply put, the equal protection 
clause requires each state to treat those who are similarly situated in 
the same manner.59 
Though the guarantee of equal protection seems demanding, the 
Court in Romer v. Evans60 recognized that it must be balanced against 
“the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose 
or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or 
 
 55. Act to Reset, ch. 4, secs. 2–4, §	143-760, 2017-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv., at 16 
(LexisNexis). 
 56. See ACLU and Lambda Legal Condemn ‘Fake’ Repeal of HB	2, ACLU (Mar. 30, 
2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-and-lambda-legal-condemn-fake-repeal-hb-2 
[https://perma.cc/B6NL-2USD] (indicating that ACLU-NC “will seek to amend [its] 
lawsuit to challenge [the repeal bill]”). 
 57. See infra Section II.A (discussing the equal protection challenges to H.B.	2’s 
employment and public accommodations provisions which preempted local employment 
discrimination and public accommodation measures). Unlike H.B.	2, however, the repeal 
bill does not preempt existing local employment discrimination and public 
accommodations measures but merely bars local governments from enacting new 
regulations or amending existing regulations. Act to Reset, ch. 4, sec 3, 2017-2 N.C. Adv. 
Legis. Serv., at 16 (LexisNexis). 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §	1. 
 59. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) 
(explaining that the equal protection clause represents “a direction that all persons 
similarly situated should be treated alike” (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). 
 60. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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persons.”61 In light of this practical reality, a regulation subject to an 
equal protection challenge normally need only withstand rational 
basis review, a deferential standard that merely requires a rational 
relationship between the regulation and a legitimate government 
interest.62 When rational basis review applies, a plaintiff challenging 
the regulation faces an extremely high burden—“negati[ng] every 
conceivable basis which might support [the regulation].”63 
Rational basis review, though, does not apply in all cases. For 
example, a regulation that burdens “a fundamental right, such as 
freedom of speech,”64 or “targets a suspect class”65 is subject to strict 
scrutiny, a searching standard of review under which the government 
must establish that the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest.66 Similarly, when a law implicates a quasi-
suspect class, the government must satisfy an “intermediate” level of 
scrutiny, which requires a substantial relationship to an important or a 
legitimate state interest.67 
The Court, however, has recognized only race, alienage, and 
national origin as suspect classes and gender and illegitimacy as quasi-
suspect classes.68 Notwithstanding its landmark decisions with respect 
 
 61. Id. at 631 (first citing Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271–72 
(1979); and then citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
 62. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“[A] classification cannot run afoul of 
the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of 
treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” (first citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 
505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992); and then citing New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per 
curiam))); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“The general rule is that legislation is 
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” (citations omitted)). 
 63. Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (citing Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 
356, 364 (1973)). 
 64. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) 
(citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)). 
 65. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (citing Heller, 509 U.S. at 319–20). 
 66. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (indicating that, “when a statute classifies by 
race, alienage, or national origin[,] .	.	. [it is] subjected to strict scrutiny and will be 
sustained only if [it is] suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest” and that a 
regulation that burdens a personal constitutional right is treated likewise (first citing 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); and then citing Graham v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 365 (1971))). 
 67. See id. at 440–41 (explaining the standards of review applicable to laws making 
distinctions based on gender and illegitimacy). The government’s interest must be 
important when a regulation discriminates based on gender, but need only be legitimate if 
it discriminates based on illegitimacy. See id. at 441 (indicating the type of interest 
required for regulations that discriminate based on gender or illegitimacy). 
 68. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (addressing the suspect and quasi-suspect 
classes). 
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to LGBT rights in Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas,69 United States 
v. Windsor,70 and Obergefell v. Hodges,71 the Court never has defined 
sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, or transgender 
status as either a suspect or quasi-suspect class. And none of the 
Court’s opinions in those cases bear the marks of strict or 
intermediate scrutiny. In 1996, when the Court in Romer struck down 
an amendment to Colorado’s constitution that barred the state from 
adopting measures designed to protect those with “homosexual, 
lesbian or bisexual orientation,”72 the Court did so under the rational 
basis standard: “Amendment 2 .	.	. lacks a rational relationship to 
legitimate state interests.”73 Again in 2003, the Court in Lawrence 
employed rational basis review, this time to invalidate a Texas law 
that criminalized homosexual sodomy: “The Texas statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”74 Just ten years later in 
Windsor, the Court found unconstitutional the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which defined marriage for purposes of 
federal law to mean the “legal union between one man and one 
woman,”75 using words that connote the rational basis standard: “The 
federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the 
purpose and effect to disparage and injure those whom the State, by 
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”76 And 
 
 69. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 70. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 71. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 72. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996) (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, 
§	30b). 
 73. Id. at 632; see Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Romer nowhere 
suggested that the Court recognized a new suspect class.”). 
 74. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court today 
does not .	.	. subject the Texas statute to strict scrutiny. Instead, .	.	. the Court concludes 
that the application of Texas’s statute to petitioners’ conduct fails the rational-basis test 
.	.	.	.”); see also Cook, 528 F.3d at 61 (noting that Romer did not identify sexual orientation 
as a suspect class and stating that Lawrence does not alter this conclusion). 
 75. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683, 2695 (quoting Section 3 of DOMA). 
 76. Id. at 2696. In dissent, however, Justice Scalia noted that the standard of review 
the Court applied is a bit mysterious: 
The opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even mention what had been 
the central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, 
laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than mere 
rationality. That is the issue that divided the parties and the court below. In accord 
with my previously expressed skepticism about the Court’s “tiers of scrutiny” 
approach, I would review this classification only for its rationality. As nearly as I 
can tell, the Court agrees with that; its opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and 
its central propositions are taken from rational-basis cases .	.	.	. But the Court 
certainly does not apply anything that resembles that deferential framework. 
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finally, in 2015, when the Court in Obergefell declared that the 
fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex couples,77 it did so 
without recourse to heightened scrutiny.78 
Consequently, under the Court’s current jurisprudence,79 H.B.	2 
should have enjoyed the rational basis standard of review to the 
extent the equal protection challenges to the law were founded on 
disparate treatment with respect to sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or gender expression.80 The plaintiffs in Carcaño v. 
 
Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Even though Windsor does 
not contain language that suggests heightened scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted 
the decision as deeming sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect class giving rise to a 
searching review. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 480–84 
(9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the Court in Windsor applied heightened scrutiny). This 
interpretation, however, seems strained given that the Second Circuit in Windsor explicitly 
applied heightened scrutiny in considering the equal protection challenge to DOMA, see 
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–82 (2012) (concluding that sexual orientation 
represented a suspect class requiring heightened scrutiny), but the Supreme Court did not 
consider whether DOMA was substantially related to an important or legitimate 
government interest. Moreover, to suggest that Windsor implicitly recognized sexual 
orientation as a quasi-suspect class is inconsistent with the clarity of decisions in the past 
addressing whether to recognize a new suspect class. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (“[W]e conclude for several reasons that the 
Court of Appeals erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling 
for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and 
social legislation.”); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (“Nor does the 
class of uniformed state police officers over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of 
equal protection analysis.” (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
28 (1973))); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (concluding that 
“classifications based upon sex .	.	. are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected 
to strict judicial scrutiny”); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (“Section 15-314 provides 
that different treatment be accorded to the applicants on the basis of their sex; it thus 
establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 77. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (“The Court now holds 
that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this 
liberty be denied to them.”). 
 78. See id. at 2593–2608 (failing to evaluate whether traditional marriage laws bore 
any relation to a government interest); id. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Absent 
from [the majority opinion] is anything resembling our usual framework for deciding equal 
protection cases. It is casebook doctrine that the ‘modern Supreme Court’s treatment of 
equal protection claims has used a means-ends methodology in which judges ask whether 
the classification the government is using is sufficiently related to the goals it is 
pursuing.’	” (quoting GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 353 (7th ed. 
2013))). 
 79. The plaintiffs in Carcaño implicitly argue that sexual orientation and transgender 
status should be recognized as suspect or quasi-suspect classes. See First Amended 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 24, at 49–50 (asserting that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and transgender status warrants some level of 
heightened scrutiny). If they had been successful, sustaining H.B.	2 would have been more 
difficult for the government. 
 80. See Druley v. Patton, 601 F. App’x 632, 635 (10th Cir. 2015) (“To date, this court 
has not held that a transsexual plaintiff is a member of a protected suspect class for 
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McCrory,81 however, argued that discrimination based on gender 
identity constitutes sex discrimination,82 and if they were able to 
convince a court to accept this novel argument, the state would have 
faced the burden of satisfying intermediate scrutiny to the extent that 
H.B.	2 discriminated based on gender identity.83 Moreover, as Romer 
and Windsor demonstrate, the deferential rational basis standard 
might not always be so deferential.84 
 
purposes of Equal Protection claims.” (first citing Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 
1215, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2007); and then citing Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 972 (10th 
Cir. 1995))); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 397 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) 
(indicating that the Fourth Circuit has determined that “rational-basis review applies to 
classifications based on sexual orientation” and that “[t]he vast majority of other courts of 
appeals have reached the same conclusion” (citations omitted)); Lofton v. Sec’y of the 
Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]ll of our sister 
circuits that have considered the question have declined to treat homosexuals as a suspect 
class.” (footnote and citations omitted)); Gomez v. Maass, 918 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(unpublished table decision), 1990 WL 177776, at *2 (“We have held ‘that homosexuals do 
not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis 
scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause.’ Transsexuals 
are not a suspect class either.” (first quoting High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. 
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990); and then citing Holloway v. Arthur 
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977))); Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 97 F. 
Supp. 3d 657, 668 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (“[N]either the United States Supreme Court nor the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized transgender as a suspect classification 
under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 81. 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 641 (M.D.N.C. 2016). 
 82. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 24, at 
45, 49 (alleging that H.B.	2 discriminates based on sex). Courts have found that 
transgender persons, like everyone else, are entitled to heightened scrutiny when 
discrimination based on gender stereotyping is involved, but this does not mean that 
discrimination based on gender identity constitutes sex discrimination per se. See Glenn v. 
Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “[a]ll persons, 
whether transgender or not, are protected from discrimination on the basis of gender 
stereotype” and that the plaintiff was terminated because the plaintiff was perceived “as ‘a 
man dressed as a woman’	”); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221, 1224, 
1227–28 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that “discrimination against a transsexual based on the 
person’s status as a transsexual is not discrimination because of sex under Title VII[,]” that 
“[u]se of a restroom designated for the opposite sex does not constitute a mere failure to 
conform to sex stereotypes,” and that the plaintiff’s claim under the equal protection 
clause failed for the same reasons as it failed under Title VII (citation omitted)); Smith v. 
City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding, for purposes of both Title 
VII and the equal protection clause, that “[s]ex stereotyping based on a person’s gender 
non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that 
behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the 
victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity”). 
 83. See infra notes 221–31 and accompanying text (discussing discrimination based on 
gender identity). 
 84. See infra notes 156–61 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of animus on 
the rational basis standard). 
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Yet under the appropriate rational basis standard of review, 
neither H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations provisions 
nor its bathroom provisions violated the equal protection clause. As 
discussed below, H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations 
provisions were facially neutral and, therefore, distinguishable from 
Colorado’s Amendment 2, which the Romer Court struck down as 
violative of equal protection. These provisions of H.B.	2 neither 
impermissibly infringed on the ability of members of the LGBT 
community to participate in the political process nor evidenced the 
animus that the Court took to violate rational basis review in Romer. 
Similarly, H.B.	2’s bathroom provisions do not violate equal 
protection principles under a rational basis or intermediate scrutiny 
standard of review. Given the states’ important interest in protecting 
the privacy right of individuals not to be exposed to the naked or 
partially clothed bodies of members of the opposite biological sex, 
restricting bathrooms based on biological sex should survive an equal 
protection challenge. 
A. The Equal Protection Challenge to H.B.	2’s Employment and 
Public Accommodations Provisions 
1.  H.B.	2’s Employment and Public Accommodations Provisions 
Were Facially Neutral and Did Not Implicate the Equal Protection 
Clause 
Before applying any standard of review to measure a particular 
regulation under the equal protection clause, a court must conclude 
that the regulation is discriminatory, preferring one group over 
another.85 And because H.B.	2’s employment and public 
accommodations provisions are facially neutral and have no 
preferential effect, they do not face a legitimate equal protection 
challenge. 
a. Romer v. Evans 
Given that H.B.	2 was enacted in response to a Charlotte 
ordinance that offered protection against discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression in public 
accommodations, the law’s opponents naturally turned to Romer. In 
Romer, the Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment 
whose “immediate objective [was] .	.	. to repeal existing statutes, 
 
 85. See Scarbrough v. Morgan Cty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“The threshold element of an equal protection claim is disparate treatment .	.	.	.”). 
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regulations, ordinances, and policies of state and local entities that 
barred discrimination based on sexual orientation.”86 H.B.	2, 
however, was fundamentally different from the Colorado 
constitutional amendment and therefore should not have suffered the 
same fate. 
The constitutional amendment at issue in Romer prohibited the 
state and its agencies, political subdivisions, and municipalities from 
“enact[ing], adopt[ing] or enforc[ing] any statute, regulation, 
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual 
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships .	.	. [would] be 
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or 
claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status 
or claim of discrimination.”87  
Striking down the amendment on equal protection grounds, the Court 
stated that “[i]t is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws 
of this sort.”88 According to the Court, the amendment was peculiar in 
that it created “a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single 
named group,”89 “identif[ying] persons by a single trait and then 
den[ying] them protection across the board.”90 In addition, the Court 
explained that the amendment resulted not only in the “severe 
consequence” of prohibiting homosexuals from obtaining protection 
from discrimination in public accommodations, but also withheld 
legal protection from them in a wide array of private transactions, 
including employment, housing, and insurance.91 Moreover, the Court 
stressed that the amendment applied to “every level of Colorado 
government,”92 prohibiting such things as protection against 
employment discrimination by the state and discrimination at state 
colleges.93 The Court further speculated that the amendment might 
even extend to generally applicable laws that would “prohibit 
arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings.”94 
While it is tempting to conclude that H.B.	2’s employment and 
public accommodations provisions had these very same effects and 
therefore were invalid under Romer, key distinctions insulated 
 
 86. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996) (quoting Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 
1270, 1284 (Colo. 1993) (en banc)). 
 87. Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. amend. II (repealed 1996)). 
 88. Id. at 633. 
 89. Id. at 632. 
 90. Id. at 633. 
 91. Id. at 629. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 629–30. 
 94. Id. at 630 (citations omitted). 
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H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations provisions from 
attacks raised under the equal protection clause. Unlike the Colorado 
constitutional amendment, H.B.	2’s employment and public 
accommodations provisions did not discriminate against anyone. 
They did not put members of the LGBT community “in a solitary 
class with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and 
governmental spheres[,]” nor did they “withdraw[] from [members of 
that community], but no others, specific legal protection from the 
injuries caused by discrimination[] and .	.	. forbid[] reinstatement of 
these laws and policies.”95 Instead, H.B.	2’s employment and public 
accommodations provisions treated everyone in the same way, 
protecting each person against private discrimination based on race, 
religion, color, national origin, and biological sex, but not on any 
other basis—whether sexual orientation, gender identity, gender 
expression, military service, familial status, pregnancy, or political 
affiliation.96 These provisions treated men the same as women, 
Muslims the same as Christians, Republicans the same as Democrats, 
homosexuals the same as heterosexuals, transgender persons the 
same as non-transgender persons, and those who are married the 
same as those who are not.97 Unlike the amendment in Romer, 
H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations provisions did not 
 
 95. Id. at 627. 
 96. It would “contradict central equal protection principles” for a court to consider 
whether the Charlotte Ordinance would have been more beneficial to those who are 
homosexual or transgender than those who are not. See Schuette v. Coal. to Def. 
Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality by Any Means 
Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1634 (2014). As the Court stated in Schuette with 
regard to laws that discriminate based on race, the Court “has rejected the assumption 
that ‘members of the same racial group .	.	. think alike [and] share the same political 
interests.” Id. at 1634 (first quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993); and then citing 
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). The assumption is 
equally inappropriate for those in the LGBT community. See Shannon Gilreath, The 
Politics of the Single-minded: Lessons from North Carolina’s ‘Bathroom Bill’, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2016, 3:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shannon-
gilreath/the-politics-of-the-singl_b_9558682.html [https://perma.cc/FF97-DHCU] (noting 
disagreement with the decision of others in the LGBT community to push the Charlotte 
Ordinance in the face of the threat of action at the state level). 
 97. By expressly stating that H.B.	2 prevents discrimination based on biological sex, 
the North Carolina General Assembly avoided the alleged uncertainty surrounding the 
meaning of “sex” in Title VII and Title IX. While the Justice Department under the 
Obama administration contended that “sex” in Titles VII and IX included gender identity, 
see, e.g., DOJ Letter to Perry, supra note 2, at 1–2, the Trump administration has reversed 
course with regard to these policies, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra 
note 7, at 1. As discussed below, H.B.	2’s specific mention of biological sex (and omission 
of sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression) did not violate equal 
protection principles or Romer. 
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single out homosexuals or transgender persons “and then den[y] them 
protection across the board.”98 
Moreover, under H.B.	2’s employment and public 
accommodations provisions, all North Carolinians seeking protection 
against private discrimination needed to obtain that protection in the 
same way—by petitioning the General Assembly to amend its 
employment-discrimination and public accommodations statutes. This 
was not the case with respect to the amendment to Colorado’s 
constitution in Romer. Under the amendment, heterosexuals could 
obtain protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation 
through laws and ordinances adopted at the state or local level.99 
Homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals (that “single named group”100), 
on the other hand, had to appeal to the people of Colorado for a 
constitutional amendment if they wanted the same type of 
protection.101 H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations 
provisions did not have this effect. Anyone—whether heterosexual, 
homosexual, transgender, non-transgender, a veteran, a parent, or a 
senior citizen—who wanted protection against discrimination in 
employment or public accommodations could appeal to the state for 
protection, and no one could obtain such protection at the local level. 
b. Participation in the Political Process 
The Carcaño plaintiffs nevertheless contended that, by not 
allowing local governments to extend to members of the LGBT 
community protection against discrimination, H.B.	2 “impose[d] a 
different and more burdensome political process on LGBT people 
than on non-LGBT people who have state protection against identity-
based discrimination.”102 What the plaintiffs meant by this allegation 
is a bit unclear, but perhaps one might understand it as a reprise of 
the reasoning the Colorado Supreme Court employed in Evans v. 
Romer103 to invalidate Colorado’s constitutional amendment. The 
United States Supreme Court in Romer seemingly rejected the 
 
 98. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
 99. See infra note 101 (drawing a distinction between the type of “protection” 
homosexuals have as a class, which heterosexuals do not have). 
 100. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
 101. See id. at 631 (“Homosexuals .	.	. can obtain specific protection against 
discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State Constitution 
or perhaps, on the State’s view, by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability.”). 
 102. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 24, at 
48. 
 103. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). 
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Colorado Supreme Court’s analysis104—perhaps because the cases on 
which the state court relied involved racial classifications, which are 
inherently suspect105—but even if the Colorado Supreme Court’s 
reasoning were to apply, H.B.	2’s employment and public 
accommodations provisions were still constitutional. 
Applying strict scrutiny, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded 
in Evans that Colorado’s constitutional amendment impermissibly 
infringed upon the fundamental right of homosexuals, lesbians, and 
bisexuals to participate in the political process.106 In reaching this 
decision, the court observed that, while the immediate effect of the 
amendment was to repeal ordinances designed to prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, the amendment had the 
broader effect of prohibiting other ordinances and even state laws 
from providing similar protection absent further constitutional 
amendment.107 The court emphasized: 
Rather than attempting to withdraw antidiscrimination issues as 
a whole from state and local control, Amendment 2 singles out 
one form of discrimination and removes its redress from 
consideration by the normal political processes.	.	.	. 
Amendment 2 singles out that class of persons (namely gay 
men, lesbians, and bisexuals) who would benefit from laws 
barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. No 
other identifiable group faces such a burden—no other group’s 
ability to participate in the political process is restricted and 
encumbered in a like manner .	.	.	. Rather, they, and they 
alone, must amend the state constitution in order to seek 
legislation which is beneficial to them.108 
As discussed above, H.B.	2’s employment and public 
accommodations provisions part company with Colorado’s 
constitutional amendment in this respect. Contrary to the Colorado 
Supreme Court’s analysis of Amendment 2, H.B.	2 does not single out 
“an independently identifiable group”109 and exclude it from recourse 
to the normal political processes. Instead, H.B.	2 “withdraw[s] 
 
 104. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626 (“We .	.	. now affirm the judgment, but on a rationale 
different from that adopted by the State Supreme Court.”). 
 105. Sexual orientation has never been recognized as a suspect class. See supra notes 
68–71 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1286 (applying strict scrutiny because of the amendment’s 
effect on the political process). 
 107. Id. at 1284–85. 
 108. Id. at 1285. 
 109. Id. 
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antidiscrimination issues as a whole from .	.	. local control,”110 which 
the Colorado Supreme Court indicated is permissible. 
This critical difference applies equally when considering the 
measures at issue in the Reitman v. Mulkey,111 Hunter v. Erickson,112 
and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,113 federal precedents 
on which the Colorado Supreme Court relied in reaching its decision 
in Evans.114 In Reitman, the United States Supreme Court considered 
an amendment to the California constitution that prohibited the state 
from “deny[ing], limit[ing] or abridg[ing] .	.	. the right of any person 
.	.	. to decline to sell, lease or rent [residential real] property to such 
person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.”115 
Declaring the amendment unconstitutional under the equal 
protection clause, the Court focused on the California Supreme 
Court’s determination that the amendment was adopted in response 
to state laws designed to bar racial discrimination and concluded that 
the amendment established a “constitutional right to privately 
discriminate on grounds which .	.	. would be unavailable under the 
Fourteenth Amendment should state action be involved.”116 While 
the immediate effect of the amendment was to repeal the 
antidiscrimination measures, the Court pointed out that it went 
further and encouraged racial discrimination: 
The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on 
racial grounds, was now embodied in the State’s basic charter, 
immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any 
level of the state government. Those practicing racial 
discriminations need no longer rely solely on their personal 
choice. They could now invoke express constitutional authority, 
free from censure or interference of any kind from official 
sources.	.	.	. Here we are dealing with a provision which does 
not just repeal an existing law forbidding private racial 
discriminations. Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does 
authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market. The right 
to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the State.117 
Like Reitman, Hunter involved an amendment that was facially 
neutral. The amendment, though, was not to a state constitution, but 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
 112. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 113. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 114. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1296–1300. 
 115. 387 U.S. at 371 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. 1, §	26 (1964)). 
 116. Id. at 374, 380–81 (emphasis removed). 
 117. Id. at 377, 380–81. 
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to Akron, Ohio’s city charter, and it reserved to Akron’s citizens the 
right to approve measures prohibiting discrimination in housing based 
on race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry.118 The Court in 
Hunter acknowledged that the charter amendment treated individuals 
in the same manner regardless of race, color, religion, national origin 
or ancestry (i.e., both whites and African-Americans would need to 
have voter approval for protection against discrimination based on 
race)119 but nevertheless concluded that the amendment was subject 
to strict scrutiny because it contained “an explicitly racial 
classification treating racial housing matters differently from other 
racial and housing matters.”120 Indeed, the amendment impermissibly 
created a two-tiered system under which those who sought protection 
from housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, national 
origin or ancestry needed voter approval while those seeking 
protection against discrimination on any other basis (e.g., sex, 
political affiliation, or parental status) merely needed to get the city 
council’s consent in most cases.121 
And Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, another 
significant case on which the Colorado Supreme Court relied in 
Evans, involved the creation of a similar two-tiered system. In 
Washington, the Court struck down a voter-approved initiative that 
had nullified a Seattle school district’s plan—the “Seattle Plan”—to 
reduce school segregation through busing.122 The statewide initiative 
reallocated to the state legislature or the state’s voters the authority 
to use busing for that purpose.123 While acknowledging that the mere 
repeal of an antidiscrimination law by the entity that adopted it would 
not give rise to an equal protection claim,124 the Court indicated that 
Washington’s voters had done more when they “lodg[ed] 
decisionmaking authority over [school integration decisions] at a new 
and remote level of government.”125 According to the Court, 
 
 118. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 387 (1969). 
 119. Id. at 390–91. 
 120. Id. at 389. 
 121. Id. at 390–91. 
 122. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 461–63 (1982). 
 123. Id. at 474. 
 124. See id. at 483 (“To be sure, ‘the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or 
antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a 
presumptively invalid racial classification.’	” (quoting Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of 
Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539 (1982))); see also Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 
527, 539 (1982) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of race-
related legislation or policies that were not required by the Federal Constitution in the 
first place.”). 
 125. Washington, 458 U.S. at 483. 
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Washington had vested in local school boards the principal authority 
to administer the state’s educational system,126 and the voter-
approved initiative impermissibly “remove[d] the authority to address 
a racial problem—and only a racial problem—from the existing 
decisionmaking body .	.	.	.”127 
The dissent in Washington accused the majority of intruding on 
the right of each state to organize its local governments in whatever 
manner it sees fit128 and suggested that the decision was founded on 
“a strange notion—alien to our system—that local governmental 
bodies can forever preempt the ability of a State—the sovereign 
power—to address a matter of compelling concern to the State.”129 
The majority, however, denied the charge, explaining that its decision 
did not rest on the fact that the local government had acted first, but 
instead on “the racial nature of the way in which [the Washington 
initiative] structure[d] the process of decisionmaking.”130 Important to 
H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations provisions, the 
Court emphasized: 
[L]aws structuring political institutions or allocating political 
power according to “neutral principles” .	.	. are not subject to 
equal protection attack, though they may “make it more 
difficult for minorities to achieve favorable legislation.” 
Because such laws make it more difficult for every group in the 
community to enact comparable laws, they “provid[e] a just 
framework within which the diverse political groups in our 
society may fairly compete.” Thus, the political majority may 
generally restructure the political process to place obstacles in 
the path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of 
governmental action.131 
The Schuette decision underscores the point that restructuring 
the political process in a way that affects everyone is permissible. In 
Schuette, the Court upheld a Michigan constitutional amendment that 
reallocated from the state and other governmental entities, including 
 
 126. Id. at 479–80. 
 127. Id. at 474. 
 128. See id. at 492–93 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 495. 
 130. Id. at 480 n.23 (majority opinion); see Coal. for Econ. Equal. v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 
692, 707 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The majority [in Washington] responded that the ‘horribles 
paraded by the dissent’ .	.	. were ‘entirely unrelated to th[e] case.’	” (quoting Washington, 
458 U.S. at 480 n.23)). 
 131. Washington, 458 U.S. at 470 (first quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 394 
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); and then quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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public schools,132 to the citizens of Michigan the power to grant 
preferential treatment based on “race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin in the operation of public employment, public 
education, or public contracting.”133 In reaching its decision, the Court 
refused to read Washington as requiring strict scrutiny whenever a 
state places decision-making authority over “a government policy 
[that] ‘inures primarily to the benefit of the minority’ and [that] 
‘minorities .	.	. consider .	.	. to be ‘in their interest’ .	.	. at a different 
level of government.’	”134 In addition, Schuette similarly limited 
Hunter, describing the decision as “rest[ing] on the unremarkable 
principle that the State may not alter the procedures of government 
to target racial minorities.”135 
H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations provisions, 
which applied broadly and did not target anyone in particular, are not 
of the same character as the measures at issue in Washington, 
Reitman, and Hunter. Granted, H.B.	2 was adopted in response to an 
ordinance giving special protection against discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression, and it left 
private entities free to discriminate based on those characteristics. 
H.B.	2 did not, however, authorize discrimination under 
constitutional authority, which was the specific type of discrimination 
that the Schuette Court emphasized was problematic in Reitman,136 
and the law preserved recourse to state government for protection 
against discrimination,137 protection North Carolina’s governor 
extended to state employees. Moreover, H.B.	2 did not affirmatively 
confer the right to discriminate as the California amendment in 
Reitman did by providing that private entities could make certain 
decisions in their “absolute discretion.”138 Furthermore, while H.B.	2 
allowed for private discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender 
identity, and gender expression, it is difficult to conclude that H.B.	2 
encouraged such discrimination in light of the fact that the law 
preserved the ability of local governments to adopt policies that 
would bar discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender 
 
 132. Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & 
Fight For Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630, 1638 (2014). 
 133. Id. at 1629. 
 134. Id. at 1634 (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 472). 
 135. Id. at 1632. 
 136. Id. at 1631. 
 137. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 373, 377 (1967) (“The right to discriminate .	.	. 
was now .	.	. immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the 
state government.”). 
 138. Id. at 371. 
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identity with respect to their own employees and left in place the 
portions of the Charlotte Ordinance that allowed the city’s 
community relations subcommittee to make “recommendations .	.	. 
for legislation or other actions to eliminate or reduce discrimination 
with respect to .	.	. sexual orientation, gender identity, [or] gender 
expression .	.	.	.”139 
In addition, unlike the charter amendment at issue in Hunter and 
the voter-approved initiative in Washington, H.B.	2’s employment 
and public accommodations provisions did not create a complicated, 
two-tier system for approval of regulations of a similar nature. With 
H.B.	2 in place, all North Carolinians had to approach the state 
government if they wanted to secure protection against discrimination 
by private entities in employment or public accommodations, and to 
the extent local governments previously had the ability to offer that 
type of protection, H.B.	2 made it clear that they no longer did. Thus, 
the law did not burden any particular group more than others, and to 
the extent it made obtaining protection against discrimination more 
difficult, it did so “for every group in the community,” as Washington 
permits.140 Under Washington, the North Carolina General Assembly 
is free to “restructure the political process to place obstacles in the 
path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of governmental 
action[,]” and because H.B.	2 allocated power neutrally, it was “not 
subject to equal protection attack[.]”141 
 
2.  H.B.	2’s Employment and Public Accommodations Provisions 
Would Have Survived Rational Basis Review 
Still, even if one could conclude that H.B.	2’s employment and 
public accommodations provisions implicated the equal protection 
clause,142 those provisions should have been subject only to the 
 
 139. Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 §	2 (Feb. 22, 2016). 
 140. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982). 
 141. Id. at 470. 
 142. Given that H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations provisions had no 
discriminatory effect, as discussed in Section II.A.1, they should not have been subject to 
any equal protection review. The remainder of Section II.A nevertheless assumes some 
basis for requiring review, and because H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations 
provisions were facially neutral, one would have to have argued that the law had a 
disparate impact on members of the LGBT community. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979) (considering a claim that a neutral law had a disparate 
impact on women). Even a facially neutral regulation having a disparate impact based on 
race or sex, however, is not subject to heightened scrutiny absent a discriminatory 
purpose. See id. at 274–75 (indicating that a neutral law that has a disparate impact on a 
protected group is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause if the law represents 
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rational basis standard of review and therefore were apt to be 
upheld.143 In Heller v. Doe, the Court explained the contours of this 
very deferential standard: 
[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor 
proceeding along suspect lines .	.	. cannot run afoul of the 
Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship 
between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate 
governmental purpose. Further, a legislature that creates these 
categories need not “actually articulate at any time the purpose 
or rationale supporting its classification.” Instead, a 
classification “must be upheld against equal protection 
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts 
that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” A 
State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to 
sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. “[A] 
legislative choice .	.	. may be based on rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” .	.	. Finally, courts 
are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a 
legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit 
between means and ends.	.	.	. “The problems of government 
are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough 
accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific.”144 
H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations provisions 
easily satisfied this standard. The state has an interest in protecting 
the bodily privacy of its citizens and visitors,145 and because an 
individual has a constitutional right to bodily privacy (as discussed in 
 
purposeful discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Standing 
alone, [disproportionate impact] does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to 
be subjected to the strictest scrutiny.	.	.	.” (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 
(1964))). Therefore, a disparate impact claim with respect to H.B.	2’s employment and 
public accommodations provisions would have been subject to no more than rational basis 
review under the Court’s current jurisprudence, and if any evaluation of discriminatory 
purpose were required, it would seem to involve the same types of considerations that are 
relevant in assessing animus. See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing animus). 
 143. But see Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2327 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the substantial uncertainty the Court has created in 
applying its various standards of review). 
 144. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–21 (1993) (internal citations omitted). 
 145. The plaintiffs in Carcaño even conceded that “bodily privacy qualifies as an 
important State interest.” Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 641 (M.D.N.C. 2016). 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that protecting against other 
invasions of personal privacy represents a substantial state interest. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. 
Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) (“Our precedents .	.	. leave no room for doubt 
that ‘the protection of potential clients’ privacy is a substantial state interest.’	” (quoting 
Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 769)); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993) (finding that 
protecting the privacy of potential CPA clients “is a substantial state interest”). 
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Part II.B below), this interest is one of the highest order. By requiring 
private businesses to allow anyone—regardless of biological sex, 
gender identity, or gender expression—to use the restroom or 
changing facility of his or her choice,146 the Charlotte Ordinance 
threatened this interest, and H.B.	2 responded to this threat.147 As 
North Carolina’s governor, Pat McCrory, explained immediately after 
signing H.B.	2: 
The basic expectation of privacy in the most personal of 
settings, a restroom or locker room, for each gender was 
violated by government overreach and intrusion by the mayor 
and city council of Charlotte. This radical breach of trust and 
security .	.	. not only impacts the citizens of Charlotte but 
people who come to Charlotte to work, visit or play. This new 
government regulation defies common sense and basic 
community norms by allowing, for example, a man to use a 
woman’s bathroom, shower or locker room.	.	.	. [T]he mayor 
and city council took action far out of its core responsibilities.148 
Needless to say, by preempting local employment discrimination 
and public accommodations measures, H.B.	2 did more than just 
remedy the Charlotte Ordinance’s threat to the right to bodily 
privacy. The rational basis standard, however, only requires that there 
be some conceivable justification for the reach of the law. Under 
H.B.	2, whether a business is operating in Charlotte, Greensboro, 
Raleigh, Murphy, or Manteo, the same nondiscrimination rules 
applied, and the General Assembly reasonably could have concluded 
that those consistent measures would “improve intrastate commerce” 
and “attract[] new businesses, organizations, and employers to the 
State”149 by reducing the costs associated with monitoring and 
 
 146. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text (explaining the effect of the 
Charlotte Ordinance). 
 147. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that firing a 
transgender woman because of safety concerns associated with restroom usage might 
satisfy rational basis review); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224–25 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (finding that concern about restroom usage by a transgender woman was a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment); Johnston v. Univ. 
of Pittsburgh, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 669 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (“[S]egregating .	.	. bathroom and 
locker room facilities on the basis of birth sex is ‘substantially related to a sufficiently 
important government interest.’	” (quoting Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316)). 
 148. Press Release, North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory, Governor McCrory Takes 




 149. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, ch. 3, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 12, 12 
(repealed 2017); see Sims v. Kia Motors of Am., Inc., 839 F.3d 393, 399 n.9 (5th Cir. 2016) 
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complying with antidiscrimination policies that vary from place to 
place. And it is irrelevant whether the employment and public 
accommodations provisions actually achieved these ends, for “the 
Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will 
eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.”150 Therefore, the 
fact that the legislation may have caused some businesses not to do 
business in North Carolina did not undermine the legitimacy of the 
state’s proffered interest. After all, as the Court has acknowledged, 
legislation frequently does not achieve its desired end: “[T]he law 
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be 
constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, 
and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was 
a rational way to correct it.”151 
In addition, given its experience with Charlotte, the General 
Assembly could have decided to preempt all local nondiscrimination 
measures to prevent unknown and unknowable future conflicts of the 
same type that might otherwise arise. And the North Carolina 
General Assembly had every right to do this given the relationship of 
the state to its local governments, a relationship that is fundamentally 
different than that between the federal government and the states. 
While federal-state relations involve separate sovereigns deriving 
power from separate sources,152 local governments in North Carolina 
and in other states are agents of the state, derive their power from the 
state, and are subject to the control of the state, as the Court 
explained in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh153: 
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, 
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the 
governmental powers of the state as may be [e]ntrusted to 
them.	.	.	. The number, nature, and duration of the powers 
 
(“Texas probably also has an interest in enacting legislation to attract businesses like Kia 
to the state.”); Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 330 F.3d 904, 915 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing 
that a state has “a legitimate and important state interest in regulating intra state 
commerce” (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 279 (1961); Union 
Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 211 (1944)). 
 150. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 151. Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (emphasis added); see 
also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (“Our recent decisions 
make it plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation 
nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare.	.	.	. [S]tate 
legislatures have constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques; they are 
entitled to their own standard of the public welfare .	.	.	.”). 
 152. See infra Part III (explaining the relationship between the federal government and 
that of the several states). 
 153. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
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conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which 
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the 
state .	.	.	. The state, .	.	. at its pleasure, may modify or 
withdraw all such powers, .	.	. repeal the charter and destroy 
the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or 
unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or 
even against their protest. In all these respects the state is 
supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the 
state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any 
provision of the Constitution of the United States.154 
Thus, cities and counties in North Carolina generally only have 
such authority as the General Assembly grants them,155 and while the 
General Assembly has bestowed on the state’s cities and counties 
relatively broad authority to regulate public health, safety, and 
welfare,156 what the General Assembly has given, the General 
Assembly may take away. 
3.  H.B.	2’s Employment and Public Accommodations Provisions Did 
Not Evidence Animus 
Despite ostensibly applying the deferential rational basis 
standard of review to the Colorado constitutional amendment in 
Romer and to DOMA in Windsor, the Court struck the two measures 
down, and it did so because it found that they were motivated by 
animus—“a bare .	.	. desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”157 
 
 154. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178–79. See generally Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina 
Local Governments Need Home Rule?, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1983 (2006) (discussing local 
government power in general and in North Carolina in particular). 
 155. See Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cty. of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 149, 731 S.E.2d 800, 
807 (2012) (observing that the General Assembly controls North Carolina counties); 
Homebuilders Ass’n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 42, 442 S.E.2d 45, 
49 (1994) (“The law is well-settled that ‘a municipality has only such powers as the 
legislature confers upon it.’	” (quoting Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 
520, 186 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1972))). 
 156. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	153A-121(a) (2015) (“A county may by ordinance define, 
regulate, prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions, detrimental to the health, safety, 
or welfare of its citizens and the peace and dignity of the county, and may define and abate 
nuisances.”); id. §	153A-4 (providing that North Carolina statutory law governing counties 
“shall be broadly construed”); id. §	160A-174(a) (“A city may by ordinance define, 
prohibit, regulate, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions detrimental to the health, safety, 
or welfare of its citizens and the peace and dignity of the city; and may define and abate 
nuisances.”); id. §	160A-4 (providing that North Carolina city charters and North Carolina 
statutory law governing cities “shall be broadly construed”). 
 157. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)); see United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 
(2013) (“The Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate 
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As a result, one must consider whether H.B.	2’s employment and 
public accommodations provisions were motivated by animus toward 
those in the LGBT community and therefore “def[y] .	.	. th[e] 
conventional [rational basis] inquiry.”158 
Under Romer and Windsor, H.B.	2’s employment and public 
accommodations provisions must be “explore[d] .	.	. for signs that 
they are, as a structural matter, aberrational in a way that advantages 
some and disadvantages others.”159 Granted, the Court in Windsor 
considered legislative history in determining DOMA’s purpose, but it 
did so very briefly, and it devoted the vast majority of its attention to 
whether DOMA’s “operation in practice confirm[ed] th[e] purpose” 
that the legislative history suggested.160 Moreover, the Court’s 
summary of why DOMA was unconstitutional focused entirely on the 
law’s effect,161 thereby reinforcing the conclusion that how a law 
operates is essential in determining whether animus was the sole 
motivation. 
Thus, even if statements by a handful of members of the North 
Carolina General Assembly162 might suggest animus, those statements 
would not have been enough to invalidate H.B.	2. To have been 
invalid, the structure of H.B.	2’s employment and public 
accommodations provisions would have had to have provided strong 
evidence of animus; considered in light of Romer and Windsor, the 
evidence was scant at best. 
H.B.	2’s employment and public accommodations provisions 
differed from the Colorado constitutional amendment and DOMA in 
a number of significant ways. First, H.B.	2’s employment and public 
accommodations provisions were not of “an unusual character.”163 
 
treatment of that group.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 
(1973))). The Court has invalidated other measures due to animus. See City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446, 450 (1985) (applying the rational basis standard to 
strike down a permitting requirement that “appear[ed] .	.	. to rest on an irrational 
prejudice against the mentally retarded”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
534, 538 (1973) (applying the rational basis standard and concluding that a provision of the 
Food Stamp Act was “wholly without any rational basis”). 
 158. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
 159. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1100 (10th Cir. 2014) (Holmes, J., concurring); see 
Susannah W. Pollvogt, Forgetting Romer, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 86, 90 (2013) 
(indicating that Romer’s “animus inquiry ultimately does not focus on the subjective intent 
motivating a law but on whether the law functions to enforce private bias”). 
 160. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
 161. See id. at 2695–96 (summarizing the Court’s analysis). 
 162. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 
24, at 30–35 (reciting statements of various legislators regarding H.B.	2). 
 163. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (1996) (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 
277 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928)). 
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State laws across the country govern discrimination in employment 
and public accommodations, and many offer no protection against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.164 
Moreover, North Carolina has many laws that prohibit discrimination 
statewide,165 and before H.B.	2, the General Assembly had preempted 
local laws dealing with other matters.166 Furthermore, given that the 
Charlotte Ordinance did not seek to amend the city’s housing-related 
antidiscrimination ordinances, even Charlotte apparently recognized 
that it does not have plenary authority to adopt antidiscrimination 
measures.167 
 
 164. See State Laws on Employment-Related Discrimination, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (July 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment
/discrimination-employment.aspx [https://perma.cc/8U2V-3TQS] (including a chart 
detailing statewide employment discrimination laws); State Public Accommodation Laws, 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (July 13, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-
and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/TZ62-4P3N] 
(including a chart detailing statewide public accommodations laws). 
 165. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	18B-1006(k) (2016) (prohibiting granting alcohol licenses 
to clubs that discriminate on certain bases); id. §§	18B-1202(4), 18B-1215 (prohibiting 
discrimination on certain bases with respect to wineries); id. §§	41A-4, to -5 (prohibiting 
discriminatory housing practices); id. §	53-180(d) (prohibiting discrimination on certain 
bases with respect to consumer credit); id. §	58-65-85 (addressing discrimination in 
connection with insurance); id. §	58-84-55 (prohibiting trustees of firefighters’ relief funds 
from discriminating based on race); id. §	66-356(a) (prohibiting cable service providers 
from discriminating based on race); id. §	90-285.1(17) (allowing Board of Examiners for 
Nursing Home Administrators to take disciplinary action with respect to discrimination on 
certain bases); id. §	95-151 (prohibiting discrimination in connection with regulation of 
labor); id. §	115C-218.55 (prohibiting charter schools from discriminating on certain 
bases); id. §	115D-77 (declaring a policy of State Board of Community Colleges and local 
boards of trustees not to discriminate on certain bases); id. §	126-16 (prohibiting 
discrimination on certain bases in employment by state agencies and local governments); 
id. §	131A-8 (requiring facilities financed under Health Care Facilities Finance Act not to 
discriminate on certain bases); id. §§	131E-8(a), 131E-13(a) (addressing discrimination in 
hospitals); id. §	143-135.5(b) (declaring policy not to do business with businesses who have 
discriminated on certain bases); id. §	143-422.2 (prohibiting discrimination on certain bases 
by private employers); id. §	153A-263(7) (prohibiting counties and cities from accepting 
real or personal property for a public library if conditioned on discriminating on certain 
bases); id. §	159D-40(a)(4) (requiring facilities financed under Private Capital Facilities 
Finance Act not to discriminate on certain bases); id. §	160A-353(6) (prohibiting counties 
and cities from accepting real or personal property for a parks and recreation program if 
conditioned on discriminating on certain bases); id. §	166A-19.74 (prohibiting 
discrimination on certain bases in the provision of emergency services); id. §	168A-5 
(prohibiting discrimination in employment based on disability). 
 166. See, e.g., id. §	14-409.40(a) (preempting local laws regulating firearms); id. §	90-
113.60 (preempting local laws regulating the retail sale of pseudoephedrine). 
 167. Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 §	3 (Feb. 22, 2016) (not including any 
amendments to the nondiscrimination provisions in CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES §§	6-59(b), 12-111, -114, -115 (2016)); id. §§	12-111, -114, -115 (Feb. 22, 
2016) (prohibiting discrimination based on various characteristics in real estate 
transactions and in providing real estate brokerage services). One member of North 
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Second, H.B.	2’s effect was very modest when compared to the 
expansive reach of Colorado’s constitutional amendment and 
DOMA. In Romer, the Court stated: “the amendment has the 
peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability 
on a single named group .	.	.	. [And] its sheer breadth is so 
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment 
seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects 
.	.	.	.”168 And the Windsor Court expressed similar alarm: “DOMA 
writes inequality into the entire United States Code.”169 
While the Colorado amendment in Romer “identifie[d] persons 
by a single trait and then denie[d] them protection across the 
board”170—protection from discrimination in the “private sphere” and 
at “every level of Colorado government”171—H.B.	2 did no such thing. 
Though H.B.	2 did not provide LGBT persons with protection from 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender 
expression in private employment or public accommodations and 
prevented LGBT persons from obtaining that protection at the local 
level, it did not single out LGBT persons for different treatment. 
H.B.	2 treated those who are heterosexual or cisgender in the same 
way—they likewise had no protection from discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression in private 
employment or public accommodations, and they had to look to state 
government if they wished to obtain that protection. This was not the 
case with the Colorado constitutional amendment, which left 
heterosexuals free to obtain protection against discrimination based 
on sexual orientation from local governments while making 
homosexuals seek a new constitutional amendment to secure the 
same type of protection. Nor was it the case with DOMA, which 
conferred benefits on those in state-recognized heterosexual 
marriages, but not state-recognized homosexual marriages. 
 
Carolina’s General Assembly indicated that Charlotte did not attempt to amend the 
housing-related ordinances and that the city attorney determined that the city had no 
power to do so. See Letter from Rep. Dan Bishop, N.C. Representative, N.C. Gen. 
Assembly, to Jennifer Roberts, Mayor of Charlotte, N.C., and the Members of the 
Charlotte City Council 2 (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.votedanbishop.com/uploads/content
/dan-bishop-letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/9C4l-KT83] (noting that, because Charlotte’s 
charter expressly authorizes the city to adopt housing nondiscrimination ordinances on 
certain bases, “the City Attorney concluded last year that Council could not modify the 
classifications (by adding sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, etc.) to 
Charlotte’s housing nondiscrimination ordinance”). 
 168. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 169. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 170. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
 171. Id. at 629. 
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Third, H.B.	2 allowed for protection of members of the LGBT 
community in ways that Colorado’s constitutional amendment would 
not have. For example, H.B.	2 specified that local governments could 
adopt regulations applicable to their own employees to protect 
against discrimination, whether based on sexual orientation, gender 
identity, gender expression, or any other characteristic.172 Moreover, 
H.B.	2 left LGBT persons, like everyone else, free to petition the 
General Assembly for protection against both public and private 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender 
expression, and the General Assembly could grant that protection 
without a statewide referendum.173 Finally, H.B.	2 did nothing to bar 
state officials from adopting policies that prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression 
with respect to state government employees, and North Carolina’s 
governor adopted such a policy shortly after H.B.	2’s enactment.174 
None of these state and local government measures would have been 
possible under the constitutional amendment at issue in Romer. 
Fourth, H.B.	2 did not preempt all of the protections that 
Charlotte sought to give with respect to sexual orientation, gender 
identity, and gender expression.175 The Charlotte Ordinance 
prohibited the city from entering into contracts with and procuring 
goods and services from providers that “discriminate on the basis of 
 
 172. See Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, ch. 3, secs. 2.1, 3.1, §§	95-25.1, 143-
422.2, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 12, 14, 15 (repealed 2017) (providing that state law preempts 
local measures with respect to employment discrimination, “except regulations applicable 
to personnel employed by [a unit of local government or other political subdivision of the 
state] that are not otherwise in conflict with State law”). 
 173. Cf. N.C. CONST. art. I, §	12. See generally Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, 
ch. 3, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 12 (repealed 2017) (omitting any reference to statewide 
referenda). 
 174. See N.C. Exec. Order No. 93, §	2 (Apr. 12, 2016) (Governor Pat McCrory’s order 
“To Protect Privacy and Equality”) (declaring that “North Carolina is committed to 
administering and implementing all State human resources policies, practices and 
programs .	.	. without unlawful discrimination, harassment or retaliation on the basis of .	.	. 
sexual orientation [or] gender identity”). 
 175. Arguably, given the statutory definition of place of public accommodation under 
state law, H.B.	2 had no effect on the Charlotte Ordinance’s expansion of the non-
discrimination provisions applicable to lawfully operating taxis and other vehicles for hire 
to include sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression. See N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§	168A-3(8) (2015) (defining “	‘[p]lace of public accommodations’ [to] include[] .	.	. any 
place, facility, store, other establishment, hotel, or motel, which supplies goods or services 
on the premises to the public or which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of any 
person”); Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 §	4 (Feb. 22, 2016). One might conclude, on the 
other hand, that H.B.	2’s public accommodation provisions effectively preempted the 
ordinance in this respect as well. See Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, ch. 3, sec. 
3.3, §	143-422, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 15–16. 
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.	.	. sexual orientation, gender identity, [and] gender expression .	.	. in 
the solicitation, selection, hiring, or treatment of subcontractors, 
vendors, suppliers or commercial customers.”176 H.B.	2, however, 
limited only the city’s ability to condition contracts based on 
discrimination with respect to “employment practices or .	.	. the 
provision of goods, services, or accommodations to any member of 
the public[,]”177 thereby leaving Charlotte free not to do business with 
a provider that discriminates in dealing with subcontractors, vendors, 
or suppliers. Moreover, subject to limitations under state law, 
Charlotte’s community relations subcommittee still could have made 
“recommendations .	.	. for legislation or other actions to eliminate or 
reduce discrimination with respect to .	.	. sexual orientation, gender 
identity, [or] gender expression,” and the subcommittee’s conciliation 
division could have approved plans for that purpose, as the Charlotte 
Ordinance provided.178 Thus, while the city could not force private 
entities to refrain from discriminating in employment and public 
accommodations, it could have, for example, initiated campaigns 
encouraging private entities to do so voluntarily. 
Finally, whereas the Court criticized Colorado’s Amendment 2 
for being at once too narrow and too broad, H.B.	2’s provisions were 
precisely tailored to accomplish its goals179: to change a Charlotte 
policy the state’s lawmakers believed went too far and to provide 
“consistent statewide [laws and obligations] for all businesses, 
organizations, and employers doing business in the State”180 with 
respect to employment practices and service of customers. 
Nevertheless, the Carcaño plaintiffs indicated that the legislature’s 
stated justifications for H.B.	2 were a mere pretext for discriminating 
against members of the LGBT community because H.B.	2 did not 
extend across the state the protection against discrimination with 
respect to sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression 
that Charlotte sought to give.181 This argument suggests that 
Charlotte’s granting the protection for the LGBT community tied the 
General Assembly’s hands and left the legislature no choice but to 
 
 176. Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 §	1 (Feb. 22, 2016) (amending contracting 
provisions in CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§	2-151, 2-152, 2-153, 2-166, 2-
167 (2016)). 
 177. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, ch. 3, sec. 2.2, §	153A-449(a) 2016 N.C. 
Sess. Laws at 14–15. 
 178. Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 §	2 (Feb. 22, 2016). 
 179. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
 180. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, ch. 3, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 12. 
 181. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 24, at 
48. 
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extend the same protection if it wanted to adopt a preemptive 
statewide policy that would not violate the equal protection clause. If 
this were true, it would mean that Charlotte, by acting first, could 
effectively dictate the scope of a statewide policy that the equal 
protection clause does not require182—a result that would 
disenfranchise the scores of North Carolinians who have no voice in 
the election of Charlotte’s city officials. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, H.B.	2’s employment and public 
accommodations provisions did not defy the conventional rational 
basis inquiry.183 In Romer, the Court stated that, “in making a general 
announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular 
protections from the law, [the amendment] inflict[ed] on them 
immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any 
legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it.”184 H.B.	2’s 
employment and public accommodations provisions made no such 
announcement and inflicted no such harm, and given their limited 
scope, the provisions could not be explained as the result of “a bare 
.	.	. desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”185 The provisions 
conceivably served North Carolina’s interests in protecting bodily 
privacy, promoting intrastate commerce, and attracting businesses to 
the state,186 which is all the equal protection clause requires under the 
rational basis test.187 
 
 182. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 
576 (1995) (“[T[he guarantee[] of .	.	. equal protection ‘erec[ts] no shield against merely 
private conduct.’	” (first quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); then quoting 
NLRB v. Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976))). 
 183. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
 184. Id. at 635. 
 185. Id. at 634 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 186. There are differing opinions as to what economic effect H.B.	2 would have had on 
North Carolina. Compare AP: ‘Bathroom Bill’ to Cost North Carolina $3.76B, WBTV 
(Mar. 27, 2017, 4:24 AM), http://www.wbtv.com/story/35002047/ap-bathroom-bill-to-cost-
north-carolina-376b [http://perma.cc/J333-KKDH] (“The Associated Press has determined 
that North Carolina’s law limiting LGBT protections will cost the state more than $3.76 
billion in lost business over a dozen years.”), with Colin Campbell, HB2 Losses Not 
Affecting NC’s Overall Economy, McCrory Budget Director Says, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Aug. 15, 2016, 2:17 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article95757872.html [http://perma.cc/W2X8-K33H] (noting that the budget 
director for North Carolina’s governor had suggested that the losses associated with the 
NBA decision to move the All-Star Game from Charlotte and the PayPal decision to 
cancel an expansion “aren’t big enough to affect the state’s overall economic growth, in 
part because North Carolina ranks as the 23rd largest economy in the world”). See also 
Rebecca Tippett, If US States Were Countries, NC Would Be the World’s 35th Largest 
Economy, UNC CAROLINA POPULATION CTR. (Jan. 20, 2015), 
http://demography.cpc.unc.edu/2015/01/20/if-us-states-were-countries-nc-would-be-the-
worlds-35th-largest-economy/ [http://perma.cc/US6N-B7Q2] (indicating that, “[i]f North 
Carolina were a country, its GDP of $471 billion would be the 28th in the world,” and that, 
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B. The Fundamental Right to Bodily Privacy and the Equal 
Protection Challenge to H.B.	2’s Bathroom Provisions 
Because H.B.	2 restricted bathroom usage based on biological 
sex, the statute facially discriminated on the basis of gender under the 
Court’s equal protection cases.188 In the language of United States v. 
Virginia,189 such legislation literally “closes a door .	.	. to women (or to 
men)”—specifically, the door to any restroom, shower room, locker 
room, or other changing facility set aside for members of the other 
biological sex.190 Consequently, if a plaintiff challenges a state’s policy 
of restricting bathrooms or other changing facilities based on 
biological sex, the state would have to show that the “classification 
serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory 
means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.’	”191 To garner heightened scrutiny in the H.B.	2 
 
“[i]f the U.S. states were treated as individual countries, North Carolina would be the 35th 
largest economy in the world”). As discussed in Section II.A.3 above, however, whether 
H.B.	2 actually would have achieved its purpose is irrelevant to its constitutionality. 
 187. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“[A] classification ‘must be upheld 
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that 
could provide a rational basis for the classification.’	” (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (citations omitted)). 
 188. The Supreme Court’s equal protection cases take gender to be a quasi-suspect 
class and apply intermediate scrutiny to gender-based classifications. See Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating that “classifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives”). In the equal protection context, “gender” and “sex” are used 
interchangeably. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Parties who seek 
to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive 
justification’ for the action. Today’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or 
opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history.”). At a minimum, both terms 
include biological sex. The Carcaño plaintiffs and other LGBT advocates contend that 
“gender” and “sex” should be interpreted to include gender identity, although the exact 
scope of their proposed definition of “gender” and “sex” remains unclear. First Amended 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 24, at 53–54; See G.G. ex rel. 
Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 737–38 (4th Cir. 2016) (Niemeyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (analyzing the uncertainty surrounding the 
meaning of “sex” and if that term includes gender identity, not just biological sex), vacated 
and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.). As discussed above, the Supreme Court 
never has held that distinctions based on gender identity are subject to heightened 
scrutiny. See infra Section II.A. Because the Supreme Court has not interpreted “gender” 
or “sex” to include gender identity, this Article uses “gender” and “sex” interchangeably 
to refer to biological sex while recognizing that the Carcaño plaintiffs and others argue 
that these terms should include gender identity.  
 189. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 190. Id. at 532 (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 
 191. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler v. 
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). 
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case, the Carcaño plaintiffs claimed that H.B.	2’s bathroom provisions 
discriminated based on sex and that “sex” should have been 
interpreted to include gender identity.192 Under this position, H.B.	2’s 
bathroom provisions constituted gender-based discrimination—and 
were subject to intermediate scrutiny—because these provisions 
permitted an individual whose gender identity aligned with his or her 
biological sex to use the bathroom consistent with his or her gender 
identity but prohibited those whose gender identity and biological sex 
did not align from doing so.193 If a court had accepted this argument, 
then North Carolina would have had to have shown that H.B.	2 was 
substantially related to an important governmental interest, one that 
supported distinguishing the genders based on physiological 
differences. 
Those defending challenged bathroom provisions—North 
Carolina and the Gloucester County School Board in Virginia—
articulated two main reasons for separating public restrooms based on 
biological sex: privacy and safety.194 Although the safety justification 
did not receive much traction in the lower federal courts,195 the state’s 
privacy interest, which is rooted in the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, did. When considering alleged rights under 
the due process clause, a court must resolve two distinct issues: (1) 
how to define the right (a general right to bodily privacy, a more 
 
 192. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 
24, at 53–54. 
 193. See id. at 44–45 (“Under H.B. 2, non-transgender people are able to access 
restrooms and other single-sex facilities consistent with their gender identity, but 
transgender people are banned from restrooms and other single-sex facilities consistent 
with their gender identity.”). 
 194. See Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 626 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (noting that 
“Governor McCrory and several members of the General Assembly strongly condemned 
the [Charlotte] ordinance, which they generally characterized as an affront to both privacy 
and public safety”); see also G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 
733 (4th Cir. 2016) (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting the 
Gloucester County School Board for the proposition that: “[t]he School Board’s policy 
does not discriminate against any class of students. Instead, the policy was developed to 
treat all students and situations the same. To respect the safety and privacy of all students, 
the School Board has had a long-standing practice of limiting the use of restroom and 
locker room facilities to the corresponding biological sex of the students. The School 
Board also provides three single-stall bathrooms for any student to use regardless of his or 
her biological sex”), vacated and remanded,	137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.). 
 195. In Carcaño, the federal district court considered the safety issue to be primarily an 
empirical question, on which the state did not proffer sufficient evidence: “the individual 
transgender Plaintiffs have used facilities corresponding with their gender identity for over 
a year without posing a safety threat to anyone. Moreover, on the current record, there is 
no evidence that transgender individuals overall are any more likely to engage in 
predatory behaviors than other segments of the population.” Carcaño, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 
652 (internal citations omitted). 
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specific right to engage in intimate bodily functions without members 
of the opposite biological sex present, or something in between); and 
(2) whether the right constitutes a fundamental right under the due 
process clause such that states have an important interest in 
protecting that right. 
While the Court has acknowledged that “[t]he identification and 
protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial 
duty to interpret the Constitution[,]”196 the analysis “has not been 
reduced to any formula.”197 In Obergefell, the Court noted that 
“[h]istory and tradition [may] guide and discipline th[e] inquiry” into 
fundamental rights, but that such a historical analysis “do[es] not set 
its outer boundaries.”198 Stated differently, history and tradition 
provide one way, but not the only way, to determine whether an 
alleged right is fundamental. Thus, even though there was no specific 
tradition recognizing same-sex marriage, the Court concluded that 
same-sex couples could exercise the constitutional right to marry 
because of the “essential attributes of that right based in history, 
tradition, and other constitutional liberties inherent in this intimate 
bond.”199 
In Obergefell, the Court neither denied the important role 
history and tradition can play “in identifying interests of the person so 
fundamental that the State must accord them its respect”200 nor 
overruled the substantive due process analysis the Court employed in 
Washington v. Glucksberg.201 In Glucksberg, the Court identified two 
primary features of its substantive due process analysis: 
First, [the Court looks to see if the alleged right is] “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed[.]” Second, [the 
Court] require[s] .	.	. a “careful description” of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest.202 
 
 196. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
 197. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 198. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003)). 
 199. Id. at 2598 (citations omitted); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72 (explaining 
that more recent “laws and traditions .	.	. show an emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in 
matters pertaining to sex. ‘[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases 
the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’	” (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (alteration in original))). 
 200. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 542). 
 201. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 202. Id. at 720–21 (citations omitted). 
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Accordingly, history and tradition, coupled with the specificity 
requirement, serve to “direct and restrain” the Court so that the 
Justices do not use broad characterizations of rights to implement 
their own policy preferences.203 Moreover, if the Court determines 
that there is a fundamental right, then the government cannot infringe 
on that right “at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.”204 
Although the lower federal courts framed the right in slightly 
different ways, they found a history and tradition protecting the right 
of bodily privacy in not exposing one’s (or involuntarily being 
exposed to another’s) naked or partially clothed body. For example, 
in Faulkner v. Jones,205 the Fourth Circuit acknowledged “society’s 
undisputed approval of separate public rest rooms for men and 
women based on privacy concerns.”206 According to the Fourth 
Circuit panel, “[t]he need for privacy justifies separation and the 
differences between the genders demand a facility for each gender 
that is different.”207 Similarly, in Lee v. Downs,208 the Fourth Circuit 
recognized that, even though prisoners “surrender many rights of 
privacy[,]” they, like “[m]ost people, .	.	. have a special sense of 
privacy in their genitals, and involuntary exposure of them in the 
presence of people of the other sex may be especially demeaning and 
humiliating.”209 More recently, in his dissent in G.G. ex rel Grimm, 
Judge Niemeyer invoked the longstanding history and tradition that 
has supported separating bathrooms and other similar facilities based 
on biological sex: “Across societies and throughout history, it has 
been commonplace and universally accepted to separate public 
restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of 
biological sex in order to address privacy and safety concerns arising 
from the biological differences between males and females.”210 
According to Judge Niemeyer, the interest in not having one’s “nude 
or partially nude body, genitalia, and other private parts .	.	. exposed 
to persons of the opposite biological sex .	.	.	. is inherent in the nature 
 
 203. Id. at 721. 
 204. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (citations omitted). 
 205. 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 206. Id. at 232. 
 207. Id. 
 208. 641 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 209. Id. at 1119. 
 210. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 734 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 
1239 (2017) (mem.). 
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and dignity of humankind.”211 Drawing on these precedents when 
evaluating H.B.	2, the Middle District of North Carolina determined 
that “[t]here is no question that the protection of bodily privacy is an 
important government interest and that the State may promote this 
interest by excluding members of the opposite sex from places in 
which individuals are likely to engage in intimate bodily functions.”212 
The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have reached the 
same conclusion—that there is “a constitutionally protected privacy 
interest in [one’s] partially clothed body” that is implicated 
“particularly while in the presence of members of the opposite sex.”213 
As the Ninth Circuit noted in York v. Story,214 “[t]he desire to shield 
one’s unclothed figure from view of strangers, and particularly 
strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect 
and personal dignity.”215 And the Sixth Circuit explained in Brannum 
v. Overton County School Board216 that “the constitutional right to 
privacy .	.	. includes the right to shield one’s body from exposure to 
viewing by the opposite sex.”217 Moreover, the Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits have indicated that “[t]his interest is particularly strong with 
regard to minors.”218 
Based on this well-established history and tradition of protecting 
bodily privacy, many lower federal courts have concluded that 
individuals have a substantive due process right to avoid exposing 
their naked or partially clothed body to members of the opposite 
biological sex. As a result, the government has an important interest 
in protecting this fundamental right, and sex-segregated bathrooms 
are substantially related to that interest (by excluding members of the 
opposite biological sex from facilities where individuals are partially 
 
 211. Id. (citations omitted). 
 212. Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 641 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (citations 
omitted). 
 213. Doe v. Luzerne Cty., 660 F.3d 169, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 214. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963). 
 215. Id. at 455; see also Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(concluding that “[t]he right to bodily privacy is fundamental” and stating that “common 
sense” and “decency” protect a parolee’s right not to be observed by a parole officer of 
the opposite sex when giving a urine sample). 
 216. 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 217. Id. at 494. 
 218. See Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 604 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“Students of course have a significant privacy interest in their unclothed bodies.”); Doe v. 
Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92–93 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that it “does not require a 
constitutional scholar” to determine that strip searches violate a student’s right to 
privacy). 
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clothed or naked).219 Consequently, instead of arguing that the 
government does not have an important interest in protecting bodily 
privacy or that sex-segregated facilities are not substantially related to 
that interest, plaintiffs who challenged H.B.	2 had to contend that 
“sex” refers to differences in gender identity, not just physiological 
differences.220 Under this interpretation, bodily privacy interests 
pertain to differences in gender identity, not physiology. Thus, 
segregating restrooms based on biological sex is not substantially 
related to the government’s important interest in bodily privacy, 
which is rooted in gender identity differences. Individuals who self-
identify as male, therefore, must be allowed to use the men’s 
restroom, and those who self-identify as female must be allowed to 
use the women’s restroom. 
The central difficulty with this line of argument is that neither 
the Supreme Court nor the history and tradition the lower federal 
courts discussed have relied on gender identity to distinguish between 
men and women for purposes of bodily privacy. In fact, while the 
Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected “overbroad generalizations 
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences” of men and 
women, in at least two cases it has confirmed that physiological 
differences establish real distinctions that may warrant disparate 
treatment.221 In United States v. Virginia, the Court held that the 
Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) could not “constitutionally deny 
to women who have the will and capacity, the training and attendant 
opportunities that VMI uniquely affords.”222 At the same time, the 
Court recognized that “[p]hysical differences between men and 
women .	.	. are enduring” and confirmed its prior conclusion in 
Ballard v. United States223 that “the two sexes are not fungible; a 
community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a 
community composed of both.”224 Moreover, the Court expressly 
linked these physiological differences to privacy concerns, 
acknowledging that “[a]dmitting women to VMI would undoubtedly 
 
 219. Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 641 (M.D.N.C. 2016). (“All parties 
agree that bodily privacy qualifies as an important State interest and that sex-segregated 
facilities are substantially related to that interest.”). 
 220. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
at 9–10, Carcaño v. McCrory, No. 1:16-cv-00236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. May 16, 2016). 
 221. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (citing Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643, 648 (1975)); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223–24 
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 222. Id. at 542. 
 223. 329 U.S. 187 (1946). 
 224. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193). 
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require alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy 
from the other sex in living arrangements, and to adjust aspects of the 
physical training programs.”225 
Similarly, in Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,226 
the Court concluded that the “use of gender specific terms” is 
constitutionally permissible under the equal protection clause when 
the law at issue “takes into account a biological difference” between 
males and females.227 In Nguyen, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (“INS”) “impose[d] a set of requirements on the children of 
citizen fathers born abroad and out of wedlock to a noncitizen mother 
that are not imposed under like circumstances when the citizen parent 
is the mother.”228 The Court denied the claim that the INS policy was 
predicated on overbroad generalizations about the capacities of 
mothers and fathers, concluding that “the difference does not result 
from some stereotype” because “[t]here is nothing irrational or 
improper in the recognition that at the moment of birth .	.	. the 
mother’s knowledge of the child and the fact of parenthood have 
been established in a way not guaranteed in the case of the unwed 
father. This is not a stereotype.”229 In fact, the Court emphasized that 
refusing to recognize basic physiological differences could undermine 
equal protection: 
To fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological 
differences .	.	. risks making the guarantee of equal protection 
superficial, and so disserving it. Mechanistic classification of all 
our differences as stereotypes would operate to obscure those 
misconceptions and prejudices that are real. The distinction 
embodied in the statutory scheme here at issue is not marked 
by misconception and prejudice, nor does it show disrespect for 
either class. The difference between men and women in relation 
to the birth process is a real one, and the principle of equal 
 
 225. Id. at 550 n.19; see also id. at 540 (“And it is uncontested that women’s admission 
would require accommodations, primarily in arranging housing assignments and physical 
training programs for female cadets.”); Act of Oct. 7, 1975 Pub. L. No. 94-106	§	803(a), 89 
Stat. 531, 537 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §	4342 note (2012)) (stating that the academic and 
other standards for women admitted to the military academies “shall be the same as those 
required for male individuals, except for those minimum essential adjustments in such 
standards required because of physiological differences between male and female 
individuals”) (cited approvingly in Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550 n.19). 
 226. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 227. Id. at 64. 
 228. Id. at 59–60. 
 229. Id. at 68. 
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protection does not forbid Congress to address the problem at 
hand in a manner specific to each gender.230 
Likewise, in regard to H.B.	2, the differences between men and 
women with respect to anatomy and intimate bodily functions are 
“real,” such that the equal protection clause does not prevent the 
government from addressing the privacy issues surrounding bathroom 
use “in a manner specific to each gender.”231 
The lower federal courts also have concluded that physiological 
differences can justify treating men and women differently under 
certain circumstances. For example, in Bauer v. Lynch,232 the Fourth 
Circuit determined that physiological differences warranted different 
physical fitness standards for male and female applicants.233 The 
appellate court in Bauer considered the case of a male applicant for 
the FBI who failed to complete the required number of push-ups for 
men and was dismissed from the program even though he would have 
qualified under the physical fitness standards for female applicants.234 
He sued, claiming a violation of equal protection. The Fourth Circuit 
rejected his challenge, holding that the FBI could establish different 
standards for men and women because 
[m]en and women simply are not physiologically the same for 
the purposes of physical fitness programs .	.	.	. The Court 
recognized [in Virgnia] that, although Virginia’s use of 
“generalizations about women” could not be used to exclude 
them from VMI, some differences between the sexes were real, 
not perceived, and therefore could require accommodations.235 
In fact, the Fourth Circuit has stated in another case that to 
protect privacy interests, segregating bathrooms based on 
physiological differences between males and females is justified: 
When .	.	. a gender classification is justified by acknowledged 
differences [between men and women], identical facilities are 
not necessarily mandated. Rather, the nature of the difference 
dictates the type of facility permissible for each gender. The 
point is illustrated by society’s undisputed approval of separate 
public rest rooms for men and women based on privacy 
concerns. The need for privacy justifies separation and the 
 
 230. Id. at 73. 
 231. Id. 
 232. 812 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 233. Id. at 351. 
 234. Id. at 342. 
 235. Id. at 350. 
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differences between the genders demand a facility for each 
gender that is different.236 
Drawing on these Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedents, 
the district court in Carcaño determined that H.B.	2’s bathroom 
provisions were “substantially related to the State’s interest in 
segregating bathrooms, showers, and other similar facilities on the 
basis of physiology.”237 
Consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Bauer and the 
district court’s conclusion in Carcaño, the Second, Third, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits have recognized a right to bodily privacy that 
encompasses a right not to have one’s naked or partially naked body 
exposed to individuals of the opposite biological sex.238 In Johnston v. 
University of Pittsburgh,239 a federal district court reached the same 
conclusion—the right to bodily privacy relates to biological sex, not 
gender identity. The Johnston court specifically addressed the right of 
a transgender male to use the men’s restrooms and locker rooms at 
the University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown.240 The court ultimately 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim that biological sex-segregated facilities 
constitute sex discrimination under the equal protection clause. 
According to the court, sex-based discrimination for equal protection 
 
 236. Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 1993) (emphasis omitted). 
 237. Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 644 (M.D.N.C. 2016). The district court 
went on to conclude that H.B.	2’s “use of birth certificates as a proxy for sex is 
substantially related to the State’s privacy interest in separating individuals with different 
physiologies.” Id. 
 238. See Doe v. Luzerne Cty., 660 F.3d 169, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that an 
individual has “a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his or her partially clothed 
body” which exists “particularly while in the presence of members of the opposite sex”); 
Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 494 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that “the 
constitutional right to privacy .	.	. includes the right to shield one’s body from exposure to 
viewing by the opposite sex” (citations omitted)); Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 137 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (concluding “that female inmates had a privacy interest in protecting 
themselves from ‘the involuntary viewing of private parts of the body’ by prison guards of 
the opposite sex” (quoting Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1980))); id. at 138–
39 (“[T]here is a right to privacy in one’s unclothed or partially unclothed body, regardless 
whether that right is established through the auspices of the Fourth Amendment or the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”); Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(recognizing that “[t]he right to bodily privacy is fundamental” and that “common sense, 
decency, and [state] regulations” mandate that a parolee not be forced to produce a urine 
sample while being observed by an officer of the opposite sex); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 
450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (“We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the 
naked body. The desire to shield one’s unclothed figure from view of strangers, and 
particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and 
personal dignity.”). 
 239. 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 
 240. Id. at 661. 
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purposes requires discrimination based on biological sex: “separating 
students by sex based on biological considerations—which involves 
the physical differences between men and women—for restroom and 
locker room use simply does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.”241 Consequently, the court determined that only rational 
basis review applied.242 Yet the court went on to explain that, even if 
intermediate scrutiny were to apply, the defendant’s policy of 
segregating restrooms and locker rooms based on biological sex 
would satisfy that standard given the state’s interest in securing the 
privacy right the students have to disrobe outside the presence of 
those of the opposite sex: “[The University] explained that its policy 
is based on the need to ensure the privacy of its students to disrobe 
and shower outside of the presence of members of the opposite sex. 
This justification has been repeatedly upheld by courts.”243 
Thus, North Carolina has an important interest in protecting the 
substantive due process privacy right of its citizens to disrobe or to 
engage in intimate bodily functions without members of the opposite 
biological sex being in the same restroom, shower, locker room, or 
similar changing facility. Moreover, H.B.	2 was substantially related 
to that interest. In fact, H.B.	2 specifically addressed that issue by 
prohibiting people of one biological sex from using the same 
bathroom facilities (and showers and locker rooms) as those of the 
other biological sex, which is the particular privacy interest at issue. 
Because individuals generally, and students in particular, have a right 
not to be partially clothed or naked in front of members of the 
opposite biological sex, H.B.	2 ensured that the different biological 
sexes would use separate facilities when engaged in personal, intimate 
bodily activities. 
III. THE FEDERALISM AND SPENDING CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO THE 
DEPARTMENTS’ NATIONAL TRANSGENDER BATHROOM POLICY 
Under the spending clause, Congress has the authority “to pay 
the Debts and provide for the .	.	. general Welfare of the United 
States.”244 In the exercise of this express power, Congress may offer 
federal funds to the states and impose conditions on those moneys to 
“ensure that the funds are used by the states to ‘provide for the .	.	. 
 
 241. Id. at 670. 
 242. Id. at 668. 
 243. Id. at 669 (citing Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 
2007)). 
 244. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 1. 
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general Welfare’ in the manner Congress intended.”245 Moreover, 
Congress’s power “to authorize expenditure of public moneys for 
public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power 
found in the Constitution.”246 Consequently, Congress can use its 
spending power to “encourage a State to regulate in a particular way, 
[and] influenc[e] a State’s policy choices,”247 going so far as to 
condition federal funding on the states’ “taking certain actions that 
Congress could not require them to take” directly.248 Both Title IX 
and VAWA were passed pursuant to Congress’s spending power.249 
Thus, the constitutionality of these Acts depends in the first instance 
on whether Departments’ conditioning the preexisting funding to the 
states exceeds Congress’s spending clause authority. 
Although Congress’s spending clause power is broad, it is not 
unlimited. Because Congress is not restricted to the objectives within 
Article I’s “enumerated legislative fields” when spending for the 
general welfare,250 the Court has looked to federalism principles 
(rather than the express provisions of Article I, Section	8) to discern 
the proper boundaries of Congress’s power. To respect the 
sovereignty of states within our federal system, “the Constitution has 
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require 
the States to govern according to Congress’s instructions.”251 While 
Congress can impose certain conditions on a state’s receipt of federal 
funds, the constitutionality of Congress’s use of the spending power 
“rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the 
 
 245. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 576 (2012) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 1). 
 246. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936). 
 247. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992); see also Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.) (noting that 
Congress may use its spending power “to further broad policy objectives by conditioning 
receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and 
administrative directives”). 
 248. Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 686 (1999); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (conditioning five 
percent of federal highway funds on each state’s raising its drinking age to twenty-one 
“even if Congress may not regulate drinking ages directly” under the Twenty-first 
Amendment to the United States Constitution). 
 249. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 181 (2005) (“Title IX was 
enacted as an exercise of Congress’s powers under the Spending Clause.”); Pub. L. No. 
103-322, 108 Stat. 1916 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) 
(authorizing $1.62 billion in federal funds over six years for a wide range of programs to 
help address the problem of violence against women); Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme 
Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 101 (2002). 
 250. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65–66. 
 251. New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)). 
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terms of the ‘contract’	” with the federal government.252 If the 
financial incentives Congress dangles in front of the states to get them 
to adopt federal policies become coercive (i.e., if “pressure turns into 
compulsion”253), then the blandishments function as a stick, forcing 
States to implement the federal program and undermining the 
federalism balance that the Founders struck. Accordingly, to 
determine whether the Departments’ guidelines violate the spending 
clause, courts must carefully review the specific funding conditions as 
well as the underlying principles of federalism that serve as a primary 
check on Congress’s exercise of its spending power. 
A. Federalism as a Limit on Congress’s Enumerated Powers 
That federalism principles provide a check on congressional 
power is not surprising given that federalism is one of the defining 
characteristics of the United States’s republican form of government: 
“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the 
atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens 
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each 
protected from incursion by the other.”254 
James Madison described the unique attributes of American 
federalism in Federalist No. 51: 
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered 
by the people, is first divided between two distinct 
governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided 
among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double 
security arises to the rights of the people. The different 
governments will controul each other; at the same time that 
each will be controuled by itself.255 
The Framers predicated this dual system on a novel and “what 
might at first seem a counterintuitive insight, that ‘freedom is 
enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one.’	”256 The 
 
 252. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (citing Steward 
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585–98 (1937)). 
 253. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937). 
 254. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 255. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 256. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 220–21 (2011) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 758 (1999)); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Just as the 
separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve 
to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of 
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and 
abuse from either front.”). 
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freedom to be protected was that of individual citizens, who, as 
Alexander Hamilton asserted, are “the only proper objects of 
government.”257 Thus, the federal and state governments, working 
within their respective spheres of authority, would operate directly on 
the constituents of the nation and of each state: “The government of 
the Union, like that of each state, must be able to address itself 
immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals.”258 The other 
alternative the Founders considered—requiring Congress to get the 
approval of the states before legislating259—was rejected because “it 
might require the federal government to coerce the States into 
implementing legislation.”260 Thus, under our federal system, “even 
where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws 
requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to 
compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”261 
To ensure the liberty of individuals, the Court has recognized the 
need to protect the distinct spheres of the state and federal 
governments. The Court has emphasized that Congress lacks the 
authority to “commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by 
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program.”262 The federal government cannot force “the States to 
promulgate and enforce [federal] laws and regulations.”263 Given its 
broad enumerated powers under Article I, Section 8, “Congress has 
 
 257. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 95 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 258. THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, at 102–03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 259. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 243–44 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911). 
 260. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 164 (1992); see also 2 THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, 
IN 1787, at 197 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (noting that Oliver Ellsworth explained 
to the Connecticut delegation that “[t]his Constitution does not attempt to coerce 
sovereign bodies, states, in their political capacity .	.	. But this legal coercion singles out the 
.	.	. individual.”); 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 256 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) 
(quoting Charles Pinckney’s statement to the South Carolina House of Representatives 
that “the necessity of having a government which should at once operate upon the people, 
and not upon the states, was conceived to be indispensable by every delegation present”); 
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 9 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(noting that James Madison said “[t]he practicability of making laws, with coercive 
sanctions, for the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands”). 
 261. New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (citations omitted). 
 262. Id. at 161 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 
264, 288 (1981)). 
 263. Id. at 161 (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 762 (1982)). 
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substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of 
intimate concern to the States,”264 but Congress must exercise that 
power “directly upon the citizens” instead of directly on the states (as 
was the case under the Articles of Confederation).265 In this way, the 
Constitution protects the sovereignty of the federal and state 
governments, precluding either from undermining the proper 
authority of the other. As Chief Justice Chase famously said, “[t]he 
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, 
composed of indestructible States.”266 
Although Congress cannot directly coerce, commandeer, or 
compel a state’s legislative or executive branch to act, Congress may 
use its spending power “to encourage a State to regulate in a 
particular way .	.	. [by] hold[ing] out incentives to the States as a 
method of influencing a State’s policy choices.”267 But even in the 
spending clause context, the Court has recognized that federalism 
principles restrict the scope of congressional authority even though, 
as the Court noted in United States v. Butler,268 the spending power “is 
not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the 
Constitution.”269 Congress is permitted to tax and spend for “the .	.	. 
general Welfare,”270 which gives Congress broad authority, 
untethered from the express enumerated fields in the rest of Article I, 
Section 8.271 Not surprisingly, then, the Court has looked to the dual 
sovereign system to impose some limit on Congress’s spending power. 
Given the federal government’s expansive financial resources, absent 
a structural limit on the spending power, Congress could “tear down 
the barriers, to invade the states’ jurisdiction, and to become a 
parliament of the whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as 
are self-imposed.”272 If the federal government could use financial 
incentives to coerce states to act in a certain manner, then “the two-
 
 264. Id. at 162. 
 265. Lane Cty. v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868). 
 266. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (“[T]he States retain substantial sovereign powers under our 
constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.”); Metcalf 
& Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926) (“[N]either government may destroy the 
other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers.”). 
 267. New York, 505 U.S. at 166. 
 268. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 269. Id. at 66. 
 270. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 1. 
 271. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937) (discussing Congress’s broad 
discretion to determine the meaning of “general welfare”). 
 272. Butler, 297 U.S. at 78; see also Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 
654–55 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1661 (2017) 
2017] INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND H.B.	2 1713 
government system established by the Framers would give way to a 
system that vests power in one central government, and individual 
liberty would suffer.”273 And, as discussed more fully below, this is 
why the Court strikes down legislation passed under Congress’s 
spending power if it passes the point at which “pressure turns into 
compulsion.”274 
In addition to respecting the sovereignty of the states, adhering 
to federalism limits under the Constitution protects the integrity of 
the political system, ensuring that voters know whom to hold 
accountable for governmental actions: “[W]here the Federal 
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials 
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal 
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated 
from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”275 Coercive 
spending provisions in federal legislation do the same thing, 
undermining political accountability by effectively forcing states to 
adopt federal policy: 
Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than 
compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local 
electorate’s preferences; state officials remain accountable to 
the people. By contrast, where the Federal Government 
compels States to regulate [either directly or through spending 
provisions], the accountability of both state and federal officials 
is diminished.276 
This is true with respect to legislative and administrative policy 
as well as with regard to areas traditionally left to the states, such as 
education: “Were the Federal Government to take over the 
regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having 
nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the 
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would 
blur and political responsibility would become illusory.”277 
 
 273. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012). 
 274. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937). 
 275. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). 
 276. Id. at 168. 
 277. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). 
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B. Withholding All Title IX Funding Would Have Exceeded 
Congress’s Spending Clause Power 
Because states are separate and distinct sovereigns within our 
federal system, Congress cannot “require the States to govern 
according to Congress’s instructions.”278 Rather, under the spending 
clause, Congress may condition federal funding on the states’ 
agreeing to terms in the underlying legislation.279 Congress offers 
states certain funds to advance (what Congress determines to be) the 
general welfare of the nation, and the states then determine whether 
to accept the federal government’s offer.280 This is why the Supreme 
Court has “repeatedly characterized .	.	. spending clause legislation 
‘much in the nature of a contract.’	”281 Whether Congress exceeds its 
authority under the spending clause (by impermissibly trenching on 
the sovereignty of the states) “rests on whether the State voluntarily 
and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’	”282 Thus, Congress 
can use its spending power to “encourage a State to regulate in a 
particular way .	.	. [and] influenc[e] a State’s policy choices,”283 but 
cannot “us[e] financial inducements to exert a ‘power akin to undue 
influence.’	”284 
In the “typical case” where states have an actual choice whether 
to accept or reject federal funding, the Court requires states “to 
defend their prerogatives by adopting ‘the simple expedient of not 
yielding’ to federal blandishments when they do not want to embrace 
the federal policies as their own.”285 When the state is free to take or 
leave the proposed conditions, state officials, not federal authorities, 
are politically accountable for their decision. Voters can use the 
voting booth to reward or punish state officials for adopting the 
 
 278. New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)). 
 279. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“[I]n return 
for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”). 
 280. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (explaining that “[j]ust as a valid 
contract requires offer and acceptance of its terms,” Congress properly exercises its 
spending power only if “the [recipient] voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 
‘contract’	”). 
 281. Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17); see also Davis v. 
Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998); Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York, 463 
U.S. 582, 599 (1983); Id., 463 U.S. at 632–33 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lau v. Nichols, 414 
U.S. 563, 568–69 (1974). 
 282. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548, 585–98 (1937)). 
 283. New York, 505 U.S. at 166. 
 284. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
 285. Id. at 579 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)). 
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proposed federal policy as the state’s own. While the federal 
government may have proposed the contract, state officials accepted 
the deal, making them responsible for the new state policy.286 
Where Congress exerts undue influence over the states, however, 
state sovereignty and political accountability are threatened. This can 
occur, as in Printz v. United States,287 when the federal government 
requires the state to take certain actions, as well as when federal 
officials use their spending power to advance federal objectives while 
being insulated from political accountability. In Printz, Congress 
sought to enlist local law enforcement officials to conduct background 
checks on handgun purchasers.288 The government argued that “the 
background-check provision of the Brady Act did not require state 
legislative or executive officials to make policy” but only “to assist in 
the implementation of federal law.”289 The Court rejected this 
argument, explaining that local officials are “put in the position of 
taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.”290 In 
fact, the danger to political accountability is more acute when 
Congress legislates under its spending power “because Congress can 
use that power to implement federal policy it could not impose 
directly under its enumerated powers.”291 
1.  The Spending Clause Analysis under South Dakota v. Dole 
In South Dakota v. Dole,292 the Court set out four factors for 
determining whether Congress exceeds its spending clause authority 
under the Constitution in a given case.293 Under Dole, legislation 
passed pursuant to the spending power is constitutional if it (1) is in 
furtherance of the general welfare, (2) specifies the conditions 
“unambiguously .	.	. enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice 
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation,” (3) 
is germane to the federal project or program at issue, and (4) does not 
condition the receipt of federal funding on a state’s engaging in 
unconstitutional conduct (e.g., Congress cannot require states to pass 
 
 286. Of course, if voters do not approve of the federal spending policy (i.e., the 
contract that Congress proposed), they can vote out the federal officials for their part in 
the spending clause contract. 
 287. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 288. Id. at 903. 
 289. Id. at 926–27. 
 290. Id. at 930; see also id. (“[I]t will be the CLEO and not some federal official who 
stands between the gun purchaser and immediate possession of his gun.”). 
 291. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012). 
 292. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 293. Id. at 207–08. 
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laws banning all abortions in order to receive grants under a federal 
funding program).294 
The first and fourth Dole factors derive directly from the 
language of the Constitution but, in practice, do not impose much of a 
limit on Congress. Given that Congress has the express power under 
Article I to tax and spend for “the .	.	. general Welfare,”295 “courts 
should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.”296 In fact, the 
level of deference is so great that the Court has suggested that the 
“general welfare” may not be a judicially enforceable restriction.297 
The fourth factor recognizes that other provisions of the Constitution 
might prohibit certain spending conditions, but as Dole made clear, 
“the constitutional limitations on Congress when exercising its 
spending power are less exacting than those on its authority to 
regulate directly.”298 All that Dole requires is that Congress not use its 
spending power “to induce States to engage in activities that would 
themselves be unconstitutional.”299 In Dole, the Constitution did not 
preclude Congress’s conditioning a portion of federal highway funds 
on a state’s raising its drinking age to twenty-one because such an 
action “would not violate the constitutional rights of anyone.”300 
Congress simply proposed a condition “which the state [was] free at 
[its] pleasure to disregard or to fulfill.”301 
In the wake of Dole, the germaneness requirement also is 
routinely met. The Court concluded that conditioning five percent of 
federal highway moneys on a state’s raising its minimum drinking age 
was “directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway 
funds are expended—safe interstate travel”—even though the 
condition did not directly govern how states spent federal funds for 
the construction and maintenance of highways.302 All the Court 
required was that the spending condition be “reasonably calculated to 
 
 294. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 
U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
 295. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 1. 
 296. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citations omitted). 
 297. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1976) (per curiam). 
 298. Dole, 483 U.S. at 209. 
 299. Id. at 210. 
 300. Id. at 211. 
 301. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 595 (1937). 
 302. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (citing 23 U.S.C. §	101(b) (1982)). In dissent, Justice 
O’Connor sought to give more bite to the germaneness requirement, requiring that any 
conditions be reasonably related to the specific purpose of the program at issue. The 
drinking age requirement failed her test because it was “not sufficiently related to 
interstate highway construction to justify so conditioning funds appropriated for that 
purpose.” Id. at 214 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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address this particular impediment to a purpose for which the funds 
are expended,”303 with Congress specifying the purpose, and the 
Court deferring to Congress as to the reasonableness of the 
requirement.304 
Consequently, as the Supreme Court explained in Pennhurst 
State School & Hospital v. Halderman,305 the central question in 
spending clause cases is “whether the State voluntarily and knowingly 
accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’	”306 Under the second prong of the 
Dole test, courts must determine whether a valid contract was formed 
(i.e., whether one sovereign (the state) voluntarily and knowingly 
accepted the terms offered by the other sovereign (the federal 
government)).307 Consistent with general contract principles, the 
“knowing” requirement ensures that the federal government specifies 
all the material terms of the agreement so that states are aware of 
what they must do if they accept federal funding: “There can, of 
course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the 
conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”308 This 
requirement also explains why Congress’s broad spending power 
“does not include surprising participating States with post-acceptance 
or ‘retroactive’ conditions.”309 Congress cannot change the terms of 
the agreement ex post. Hence, in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius,310 (“NFIB”) the Court struck down the Medicaid 
expansion under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)311 because, 
among other things, “[a] State could hardly anticipate that Congress’s 
reservation of the right to ‘alter’ or ‘amend’ the Medicaid program 
included the power to transform it so dramatically.”312 
The voluntariness requirement has received the most attention 
from the Court. Whether a state can voluntarily accept the conditions 
tied to federal funding depends largely on the nature and size of the 
financial inducement that Congress offers. Although states generally 
can protect their sovereign interests by “the simple expedient of not 
 
 303. Id. at 209 (majority opinion). 
 304. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937). 
 305. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 306. Id. at 17 (citing Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 585–98). 
 307. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17). 
 308. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17. 
 309. Id. at 25. 
 310. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012). 
 311. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 312. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 584. 
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yielding”313 to federal financial incentives, at some point, the amount 
(and possibly the type314) of funds becomes “so coercive as to pass the 
point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’	”315 In Dole, South 
Dakota’s acceptance of the spending condition was voluntary because 
Congress threatened to withhold only five percent of certain federal 
highway funds—“a relatively small percentage” that “offered 
relatively mild encouragement”—if the state did not increase its 
drinking age to twenty-one.316 Thus, the Court concluded that 
Congress validly exercised its spending power.317 
2.  Determining When Pressure Turns into Compulsion 
In the wake of Dole, the critical distinction to be made in 
evaluating legislation enacted under the spending clause is between 
encouragement and coercion. While Congress has broad authority to 
entice states to accept conditions under the spending clause, the 
federal government cannot cross the point at which “pressure turns 
into compulsion.”318 For at that point, Congress properly can be 
viewed as “using financial inducements to exert a ‘power akin to 
undue influence[,]’	”319 thereby undermining the states’ ability to 
voluntarily accept the proposed contract. The Supreme Court has not 
specified exactly how much money must be at issue before a state can 
claim coercion.320 Is the inquiry made on a state-by-state basis or 
 
 313. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923). 
 314. The Court’s primary focus has been on the amount of the financial inducement. 
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 315. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 212. 
 318. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937). 
 319. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 577 (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590). 
 320. Justice Ginsburg addresses this uncertainty directly, wondering how courts should 
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Are courts to measure the number of dollars the Federal Government might 
withhold for noncompliance? The portion of the State’s budget at stake? And 
which State’s—or States’—budget is determinative: the lead plaintiff, all 
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should courts consider whether the “average” state would be 
coerced? Does the total number of dollars at stake determine the 
coercive nature of the spending conditions? Or should courts consider 
what percentage of a state’s budget the federal funding constitutes? 
Given how important the distinction between inducement and 
coercion is to the spending clause analysis, one might expect the 
Court to identify the specific point at which mild encouragement 
transforms into forced acceptance. But the Court has not done this—
not in Dole, Steward Machine, or NFIB. Instead, the Court has 
acknowledged that there is such a point and then concluded that a 
particular spending provision either has or has not crossed that line:  
The Court in Steward Machine did not attempt to ‘fix the 
outermost line’ where persuasion gives way to coercion. The 
Court found it ‘[e]nough for present purposes that wherever the 
line may be, this statute is within it.’ We have no need to fix a 
line either. It is enough for today that wherever that line may 
be, this statute is surely beyond it.321 
Although not specifying a particular point along the continuum, 
the joint dissenters in NFIB contended that “courts should not 
conclude that legislation is unconstitutional on this ground unless the 
coercive nature of an offer is unmistakably clear.”322 
In NFIB, seven justices had no problem concluding that the use 
of the spending power to expand Medicaid under the ACA crossed 
the line.323 The ACA expanded the scope of Medicaid, making new 
funds available to the states so long as the states extended coverage to 
anyone, who, among other qualifications, was under age sixty-five and 
within 133% of the federal poverty line.324 If a state refused to provide 
that new coverage, the ACA imposed a substantial sanction—the loss 
of all federal Medicaid funds, not simply the new funding related to 
the expansion of the program.325 And as Chief Justice Roberts and the 
joint dissent explained, the total amount threatened was extremely 
large—whether viewed as a percentage of the average state’s budget 
 
challenging States (26 in this litigation, many with quite different fiscal situations), 
or some national median? 
Id. at 643 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 321. See id. at 585 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted). 
 322. Id. at 681 (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 323. Id. (“In this case, however, there can be no doubt.	.	.	. If the anticoercion rule does 
not apply in this case, then there is no such rule.”); id. at 585 (majority opinion) (“It is 
enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it.”). 
 324. See 42 U.S.C. §	1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2006). 
 325. See id. §	1396c; see also NFIB, 567 U.S. at 581. 
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or the percentage of total federal expenditures to the states.326 
Whereas the highway funds at issue in Dole amounted to less than 
half of one percent of South Dakota’s budget, the funding at issue in 
NFIB constituted more than ten percent of an average state’s 
budget.327 Chief Justice Roberts stated that rather than “mild 
encouragement,” the threatened loss of all Medicaid funding was “a 
gun to the head” of states, a form of “economic dragooning that 
leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid 
expansion.”328 
The joint dissent reached the same conclusion as Chief Justice 
Roberts but focused more specifically on Congress’s overall grants to 
the states. In 2010, the federal government distributed over $233 
billion to cover costs for pre-expansion Medicaid, an amount that 
equated to approximately 22% of all combined state expenditures 
combined.329 Medicaid consumed a larger percentage of states’ 
budgets than any other item, with “federal funds account[ing] for 
anywhere from 50% to 83% of each State’s total Medicaid 
expenditures,” an amount equal to 64.6% of all Medicaid 
expenditures across the country.330 Consequently, the joint dissent 
rejected the lower court’s reasoning that states simply could raise 
taxes in an amount equal to the revenue lost if they rejected 
Congress’s terms: “[T]he sheer size of this federal spending program 
in relation to state expenditures means that a state would be very 
hard pressed to compensate for the loss of federal funds by cutting 
other spending or raising additional revenue.”331 
In contrast, the spending provisions in Dole would have withheld 
only $614.7 million in federal highway funding if every state refused 
to adopt the twenty-one-year-old drinking age—only 0.19% of all 
combined state expenditures.332 And five percent of South Dakota’s 
 
 326. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 581 (majority opinion); id. at 682 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & 
Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 327. Id. at 581–82 (majority opinion). 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 682 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing NAT’L ASS’N 
OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2010 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING FISCAL 
2009–2011 STATE SPENDING 7, 47 (2011)). 
 330. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §	1396d(b) (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 331. Id. at 683. 
 332. Id. at 684 (citing KAREN A. FARRELL, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET 
OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 1989, at 10, 84 (1989)). The total amount of 
federal funds provided for transportation expenditures in 1987 was approximately $12.3 
billion dollars, but the law in Dole threatened to withhold five percent of this amount, i.e., 
$614.7 million dollars. Act of July 17, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, sec. 158, 98 Stat. 435, 437 
(codified at 23 U.S.C. §	158(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987)). 
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federal highway funds constituted less than one percent of the state’s 
total expenditures.333 In comparison, the $233 billion in federal 
Medicaid spending that states stood to lose under the ACA was 
42.3% of all federal payments to the states,334 and South Dakota 
would have “los[t] federal funding equaling 28.9% of its annual state 
expenditures.”335 Whereas threatening to withhold 0.19% of all 
combined state expenditures was properly characterized as “relatively 
mild encouragement,” the Justices in the NFIB majority had no 
hesitation concluding that the federal government’s threatening to 
withhold $233 billion (or roughly 21.86% of all state expenditures) 
was coercive.336 
In light of Dole and NFIB, the question for courts that would 
have had to have considered the constitutionality of the Departments’ 
new directives regarding transgender access to bathrooms was 
whether withholding all education funding under Title IX also crossed 
the line from encouragement to compulsion. Where on the coercion 
spectrum did Title IX funding fall? As the joint dissent in NFIB 
pointed out, federal support for elementary and secondary education 
is substantial but runs a distant second to the federal outlays to states 
for Medicaid.337 Federal funding for K-12 education amounts to 
12.8% of total federal distributions to the states (roughly $70.6 billion 
in 2010), which is only 6.6% of all combined state expenditures.338 Of 
course, under Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, conditioning 10% of a 
state’s budget on its accepting Congress’s terms is “a gun to the 
head,” an impermissibly coercive condition that violates Congress’s 
spending power.339 And, as the joint dissent pointed out, Arizona’s 
federal education funds amounted to 9.8% of Arizona’s 
expenditures.340 This is a significantly smaller percentage than the 
thirty-three percent Arizona spent on Medicaid341 but remains a 
considerable sum nonetheless. 
 
 333. KAREN A. FARRELL, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE 
EXPENDITURE REPORT 1989, at 10, 84 (1989). 
 334. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 685 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2010 
STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING FISCAL 2009–2011 STATE SPENDING 7, 10, 
47 (2011)). 
 335. Id. (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2010 STATE 
EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING FISCAL 2009–2011 STATE SPENDING 7, 47 (2011)). 
 336. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)). 
 337. Id. at 683. 
 338. Id. (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2010 STATE 
EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING FISCAL 2009–2011 STATE SPENDING 7, 16 (2011)). 
 339. Id. at 581–82 (majority opinion). 
 340. Id. at 683 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 341. Id. 
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According to Justice Ginsburg, the joint dissent would find 
coercion if states could not, as a practical matter, resist the proposed 
federal grant. Under her interpretation of the dissent, “any federal 
spending program, sufficiently large and well-funded, would be 
unconstitutional.”342 Withdrawing Medicaid funding was coercive 
given the sheer size of the program, but states might be able to refuse 
smaller programs, such as federal funding for K-12 education (or 
presumably Title IX moneys).343 Is 6.6% of all state expenditures 
coercive? Justice Ginsburg thought not but contended that, in the 
wake of NFIB, lower courts lack sufficient guidance to know how to 
decide this issue.344 
3.  The States’ Arguments About Why Withholding Title IX Funds 
Was Coercive 
The States challenging the Departments’ guidelines had at least 
three arguments they could have made to support their claim that the 
Departments’ threat to withhold all Title IX funding (as well as all 
VAWA funding) was impermissibly coercive. First, although the total 
amount of federal funding for Title IX is less than the Medicaid 
funding at issue in NFIB, North Carolina and the other twenty-three 
states that challenged the Departments’ guidelines in district courts in 
Texas and Nebraska could have contended that the Departments’ 
“financial inducement”345 was coercive, passing the point at which 
“pressure turns into compulsion.”346 Title IX applies to all educational 
institutions receiving federal funds.347 Accordingly, the amount at 
issue was greater than the NFIB joint dissent’s discussion of federal 
funding for elementary and secondary education, which amounted to 
more than $70.65 billion in 2010.348 Though estimates vary, the 
Human Rights Campaign reported that North Carolina had 
approximately $4.5 billion in Title IX funds at risk.349 If North 
 
 342. Id. at 642 n.24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. at 642. 
 345. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra 
note 4, at 37–38 (citation omitted). 
 346. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief at 44, Nebraska v. United States, No. 4:16-CV-03117 (D. Neb. Oct. 21, 2016) (using 
language from Dole and Steward Machine Company to support the state’s argument). 
 347. Title	IX	of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §	1681 (2015). 
 348. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2010 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: 
EXAMINING FISCAL 2009–2011 STATE SPENDING 16 (2011) 
 349. In United States v. North Carolina, the Intervenor-Defendants contended in their 
Answer and Counterclaims that “[s]uch a loss [of Title IX funding] would not only impair 
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Carolina refused to adopt the Departments’ guidelines, then it stood 
to lose an amount equal to 17.9% of its $25.2 billion in general 
revenue during the 2015–2016 fiscal year.350 The threat to withhold all 
Title IX moneys, therefore, put North Carolina in the 
unconstitutional position of having to choose either to adopt the 
federal government’s new policy or to find a new way to cover lost 
Title IX funding by taking 17.9% of its revenue	from other important 
programs, or by raising taxes dramatically. As the NFIB joint dissent 
explained, such a choice is impermissibly coercive: 
When a heavy federal tax is levied to support a federal program 
that offers large grants to the States, States may, as a practical 
matter, be unable to refuse to participate in the federal program 
and to substitute a state alternative. Even if a State believes 
that the federal program is ineffective and inefficient, 
withdrawal would likely force the state to impose a huge tax 
increase on its residents, and this new state tax would come on 
top of the federal taxes already paid by residents to support 
subsidies to participating States.351 
Texas and the twenty-two other states that sued the Departments 
stood to lose similarly large amounts of Title IX funding given that 
school districts across the United States “receive a share of the 
$69,867,660,640 in annual funding that the federal government directs 
to education.”352 The roughly $70 billion in federal education funding 
constitutes approximately 9.3% of the total amount states spend on 
elementary and secondary education.353 For example, for fiscal year 
2016, Texas’s Title IX funds ($5,028,581,142) constituted 18.13% of 
 
the teaching and research mission of UNC, but would also affect K-12 education 
throughout the State. Local schools would likely be forced to curtail programs, fire 
teachers and increase class sizes—all to the detriment of the state’s hundreds of thousands 
of schoolchildren.” Intervenor-Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaims at 32, United 
States v. North Carolina, No. 1:16-cv-00425-TDS-JEO (M.D.N.C. June 30, 2016). 
Furthermore, the Intervenor-Defendants alleged that “the Department’s demands carry a 
threat to cut off over $100 million in annual federal funding currently provided to the 
State’s Department of Public Safety.” Id. at 33. 
 350. STATEWIDE ACCOUNTING DIV., OFFICE OF THE STATE CONTROLLER, NORTH 
CAROLINA	COMPREHENSIVE	ANNUAL	FINANCIAL	REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 
ENDED JUNE 30, 2016, at 51 (2016), https://ncosc.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/documents
/files/2016_comprehensive_annual_financial_report_bookmarked.pdf	[https://perma.cc
/54HM-DMFZ]. 
 351. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 680 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, 
JJ., dissenting). 
 352. Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary Injunction at 20, Texas v. United States, 
No. 7:16-cv-00054-0 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2016). 
 353. See id. 
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the Texas Education Association’s budget ($27,732,858,771).354 For 
fiscal year 2017, the percentage is expected to increase to 19.10% of 
the Texas Education Association’s budget.355 The amounts were 
roughly equivalent for the other plaintiffs in the Texas action.356 Thus, 
while less than one percent of a state’s budget is not coercive, the loss 
of a much greater percentage of education funding would have been, 
thereby precluding the executive branch from imposing such a 
condition on the states. 
Second, North Carolina and the other states could have argued 
that courts must consider not only the coercive effect of the 
government’s conditioning large sums of existing funds on the ability 
of a state to freely enter into an agreement with the federal 
government, but also the federalism implications of Congress’s having 
such authority. In support of this position, the states could have relied 
on the joint dissent in NFIB. The joint dissenters proffered an 
example dealing with education funding to highlight the need to 
protect areas traditionally left to the states. These Justices considered 
the impact of federal legislation “offering each State a grant equal to 
the State’s entire annual expenditures for primary and secondary 
education.”357 Under this hypothetical, the federal funds were 
conditioned on a state’s adopting a federal policy dictating “such 
things as school curriculum, the hiring and tenure of teachers, the 
drawing of school districts, the length and hours of the school day, the 
school calendar, a dress code for students, and rules of student 
discipline.”358 Although, as a purely legal matter, states might be able 
to reject the offer, the amount of funding is so high that, as a practical 
matter, no state would reject the offer because “its residents would 
not only be required to pay the federal taxes needed to support this 
expensive new program, but they would also be forced to pay an 
equivalent amount in state taxes.”359 As a result, the states would have 
 
 354. See CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON HOUSE BILL NO. 1, 84th Leg., Reg. 
Sess., art. III, §	1 (Tex. 2015).  
 355. Id. 
 356. In their Application for Preliminary Injunction, the plaintiffs alleged that Arizona 
would lose federal funding equal to 19.1% of its public-education budget, Kentucky 17.6% 
of its primary and secondary education budget, Tennessee 18.6% of its primary and 
secondary education budget, Alabama $246 million in federal funds for primary and 
secondary education, and the Heber-Overgaard Unified School District more than 15% of 
the district’s total budget. See Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary Injunction, supra 
note 352, at 11 n.22. 
 357. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 680 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, 
JJ., dissenting). 
 358. Id. at 680–81. 
 359. Id. at 681. 
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no choice but to acquiesce to Congress’s requirements.360 In so doing, 
though, “the State and its subdivisions would surrender their 
traditional authority in the field of education.”361 Absent the anti-
coercion check on the spending clause, Congress could circumvent 
federalism principles and dictate policy in what heretofore had been 
viewed as areas, such as education, that historically have been left to 
the states.362 This example was particularly relevant in the North 
Carolina actions because the state expressly had invoked federalism 
principles to defend H.B.	2 and to explain why the Departments 
should not have been allowed to dictate policy regarding bathroom 
and locker room access in public schools across the country.363 
Third, North Carolina and the other states that contested the 
Departments’ guidance could have contended that, because spending 
clause legislation is “much in the nature of a contract,”364 neither the 
federal government nor the states were able to materially alter or 
impose new conditions under the agreement without satisfying the 
Dole factors anew. According to these states, the Departments’ 
guidance in their May 2016 “Dear Colleague” letter would have 
imposed new requirements on the states (and hence a new contract), 
compelling acceptance by threatening to withdraw all existing moneys 
under the Act going forward. 
Not surprisingly, the federal government countered that the 
Departments’ recent instruction that the prohibition on sex 
 
 360. See, e.g., id. (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“When a heavy 
federal tax is levied to support a federal program that offers large grants to the States, 
States may, as a practical matter, be unable to refuse to participate in the federal program 
and to substitute a state alternative.”). In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg challenges the 
speculative nature of the four dissenters’ anti-coercion argument, claiming that “[t]he joint 
dissenters are long on conjecture and short on real-world examples.” Id. at 642 n.24 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Based on her understanding of 
the joint dissent’s argument, “all that matters, it appears, is whether States can resist the 
temptation of a given federal grant” such that “any federal spending program, sufficiently 
large and well funded, would be unconstitutional.” Id. 
 361. Id. at 681 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 362. During oral argument in NFIB, the Solicitor General acknowledged that under 
the government’s view of the spending clause, Congress would have the power to enact 
the type of program discussed above. Oral Argument at 39:40–50, NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 
U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-400), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-393 [https://perma.cc
/DU2J-DKB2].  
 363. Intervenor-Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 349, at 39 
(“Several provisions of the federal Constitution also make clear that the States remain 
independent sovereigns in the federal system .	.	.	. [N]one of those provisions authorizes 
any arm of the federal government to impose requirements for ‘access’ to state-owned 
bathrooms, locker rooms or shower facilities.”). 
 364. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (emphasis 
added). 
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discrimination under Title IX also precluded “discrimination based 
on a student’s gender identity, including discrimination based on a 
student’s transgender status,” constituted “significant guidance” but 
“does not add requirements to applicable law.”365 Rather than change 
existing law, the guidance simply “provide[d] information and 
examples to inform recipients about how the Departments evaluate 
whether covered entities are complying with their legal 
obligations.”366 For example, under Title IX, schools “may provide 
separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of 
sex.”367 According to the federal government, the Departments had 
clarified that “sex” includes a student’s expressed gender identity 
such that under Title IX schools “must allow transgender students 
access to such facilities consistent with their gender identity.”368 The 
prohibition on sex discrimination—to which the states previously 
agreed as a condition of receiving Title IX funds—remains the same; 
the Departments merely clarified that “sex,” which has caused 
confusion for schools regarding the rights of transgender students 
under Title IX, includes gender identity. 
In NFIB, Justice Ginsburg advanced a similar argument in 
dissenting from the majority’s spending clause analysis. According to 
Justice Ginsburg, the Medicaid expansion under the ACA was 
different from Dole because in the Medicaid context, “Congress [had] 
not threatened to withhold funds earmarked for any other 
program.”369 Congress connected the changes to Medicaid directly to 
the funding for Medicaid, which was consistent with its “broad 
authority to construct or adjust spending programs to meet its 
contemporary understanding of ‘the General Welfare.’	”370 Rather 
than create an entirely new program, the ACA brought more of 
America’s poor within Medicaid, thereby furthering Medicaid’s basic 
goal of helping states provide medical care to “needy persons.”371 
 
 365. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3, at 1. 
 366. Id. 
 367. 34 C.F.R. §	106.33 (2012). 
 368. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3, at 3.  
 369. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 631 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 370. Id. at 635 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937)). 
 371. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§	2001–07, 
124 Stat. 119, 271–85 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); S. REP. NO. 89-404, pt. 1, 
at 3 (1965); see also Social Security Amendments Act of 1965, §	121(a), Pub. L. No. 89-97, 
79 Stat. 286, 343 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	301) (stating that the purpose of 
Medicaid is to enable states “to furnish .	.	. medical assistance on behalf of [certain 
persons] whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary 
medical services”). 
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According to Justice Ginsburg, the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid left 
“unchanged the vast majority of these [Medicaid] provisions; it 
add[ed] beneficiaries to the existing program and specifie[d] the rate 
at which States [would] be reimbursed for services provided to the 
added beneficiaries.”372 Moreover, Congress viewed the expansion as 
an amendment to the Medicaid Act, not an entirely novel health care 
program.373 Thus, the ACA, like the Departments’ significant 
guidance regarding the scope of Title IX, constituted a change to an 
existing program. And in Justice Ginsberg’s view, conditioning the 
continued receipt of Medicaid funds on the states’ adopting the 
proffered changes was permissible to advance the general welfare 
under Congress’s broad spending power. 
Seven Justices rejected Justice Ginsburg’s argument in NFIB, 
and twenty-four states challenging the Departments’ directives 
argued that courts should reject the argument in the Title IX context 
as well. In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that determining 
whether a program is “a modification of the existing [Medicaid] 
program” is an objective analysis for the courts to make, not 
Congress.374 The focus must be on whether the change to the program 
is “properly viewed merely as a modification” or actually constitutes a 
new program.375 In making this determination, NFIB instructs that 
how “Congress style[s]” the changes to a program “is irrelevant.”376 
Similarly, courts cannot rely exclusively on “the number of pages the 
amendment occupies, or the extent to which the change preserves and 
works within the existing program.”377 Instead, courts should consider 
 
 372. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§	2001(a)(1), (3), 
124 Stat. at 271–72. 
 373. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 635 (“Congress styled and clearly viewed the Medicaid 
expansion as an amendment to the Medicaid Act, not as a ‘new’ health-care program.”); 
Elise Viebeck et al., Conservatives Endorse Latest Republican Plan to Revise Obamacare, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost
/conservative-pressure-groups-throw-weight-behind-gop-health-care-deal/2017/04
/26/918ad730-2a82-11e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html?utm_term=.dd6695f52a75 
[https://perma.cc/DDM5-4KQ6] (quoting Michael Needham, Chief Executive, Heritage 
Action for America, as saying, “[t]o be clear, this is not full repeal.”). 
 374. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 582 (majority opinion). 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. at 582 n.13. To illustrate this point, Chief Justice Roberts proffered the 
example of an alteration to Medicaid that was short and operated within Medicaid’s 
existing framework: “All of a State’s citizens are now eligible for Medicaid.” Such a 
proposal “would take up a single line and would not alter any ‘operational aspect[] of the 
program’ beyond the eligibility requirements.” Id. (internal citation omitted). But such a 
change would “foist an entirely new health care system upon the States” rather than 
simply modify Medicaid. Id. 
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whether the proposed changes “accomplish[] a shift in kind, not 
merely degree[,]” analyzing (among other things) “the manner in 
which the expansion is structured .	.	.	.”378 
Applying this framework to the proposed expansion of Medicaid 
under the ACA, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the ACA’s 
Medicaid provisions “enlist[ed] the States in a new health care 
program.”379 Although Congress retained the right to alter or amend 
Medicaid,380 the ACA transformed Medicaid from a program 
“designed to cover medical services for four particular categories of 
the needy” to “an element of a comprehensive national plan to 
provide universal health insurance coverage.”381 Reinforcing the 
novel nature of the expansion, Congress fashioned a new funding 
provision to cover the costs of providing services to those made newly 
eligible under the expansion and established less comprehensive 
coverage for these new participants. While Congress certainly has the 
authority to create new programs, NFIB held that Congress could not 
connect acceptance of these new conditions to the states’ pre-existing 
funding under Medicaid: “Congress is not free to .	.	. penalize States 
that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away 
their existing Medicaid funding.”382 Congress could offer additional 
funding to states that accept the ACA’s Medicaid provisions and deny 
such additional funding to any state that refused to abide by the new 
conditions. But Congress could not “surpris[e] participating States 
with post-acceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions”383 that required 
states to adhere to a dramatically transformed program or risk losing 
all pre-existing Medicaid moneys.384 
The states that challenged the Departments’ bathroom policy 
could have argued that Chief Justice Roberts’s reasoning in NFIB 
applied a fortiori to the policy. The federal government averred that 
its guidelines were merely interpretive rules, which served to clarify 
the obligations and responsibilities of schools under Title IX. 
According to the Departments, these guidelines did not create a new 
program or transform Title IX because they did “not add 
requirements to applicable law[;]” rather, they gave “information and 
examples to inform recipients about how the Departments evaluate 
 
 378. Id. at 583–84. 
 379. Id. at 584. 
 380. See 42 U.S.C. §	1304 (2012) (reserving to Congress “[t]he right to alter, amend, or 
repeal any provision” of Medicaid). 
 381. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 583. 
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whether covered entities are complying with their legal 
obligations.”385 Under NFIB, though, courts should look beyond how 
the government “style[s]” the change and consider the actual impact 
on the program or, as in this case, statutory requirements. That the 
guidelines “work[] within the existing [Title IX] program” was not 
“dispositive.”386 The states maintained that the guidelines (1) imposed 
an entirely new requirement that substantially altered—and 
conflicted with—the longstanding understanding of Title IX as 
precluding discrimination based on biological sex and (2) threatened 
to withhold all pre-existing Title IX funding if states refused to 
implement these guidelines. NFIB, so the argument goes, prohibits 
the federal government from doing either—imposing post-acceptance 
conditions and tying those conditions to pre-existing Title IX 
funding.387 Thus, conditioning all Title IX (as well as VAWA) funds 
on a state’s accepting the Departments’ new interpretation of Title IX 
impermissibly would have placed new requirements on the states. 
Instead of encouraging states to adopt the new interpretation through 
additional financial incentives, the federal government threatened to 
withhold all pre-existing Title IX and VAWA funding. NFIB 
prohibits this type of coercion: “When, for example, such conditions 
take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent 
grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring 
the States to accept policy changes.”388 
To support their position, the states could have invoked the 
Texas federal district court’s recent decision in Texas v. United 
States,389 which granted a nationwide injunction to the thirteen states, 
various state agencies, and school districts from Texas and Arizona 
that challenged the federal government’s previous claim “that Title 
VII and Title IX require that all persons must be afforded the 
opportunity to have access to restrooms, locker rooms, showers, and 
other intimate facilities that match their gender identity rather than 
their biological sex.”390 Although the district court grounded its 
injunction in the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”),391 its 
analysis bears directly on the spending clause analysis detailed in 
NFIB.392 Under the APA, agencies may issue interpretative rules and 
 
 385. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3, at 1. 
 386. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 582 n.13. 
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articulate policies without having to subject such rules and policies to 
public notice and comment.393 Legislative or substantive rules are 
different.394 Such substantive rules must be published in the Federal 
Register to give the public an opportunity to comment on them, the 
so-called “notice and comment” requirement.395 This requirement 
enables an agency to understand the impact of its proposed legislative 
rules and to modify the rules based on the comments of those 
impacted by the rules.396 
Although the APA does not specify what constitutes a legislative 
or substantive rule, the Supreme Court has held that (1) a 
“legislative-type rule” is one that “affect[s] substantial individual 
rights and obligations”397 and (2)	”the promulgation of these 
regulations must conform with any procedural requirements imposed 
by Congress.”398 Such procedural requirements “assure fairness and 
mature consideration of rules of general application.”399 According to 
one circuit court, “the most important factor concerns the actual legal 
effect (or lack thereof) of the agency action in question on regulated 
entities.”400 A substantive rule “establishes a binding norm,” a “	‘line 
in the sand’ that, once crossed, removes all discretion from the 
agency.”401 
In the Texas lawsuit, as in the North Carolina and Nebraska 
actions, the federal government argued that the Departments’ 
guidelines “[were] interpretative rules and [were] therefore exempt 
from the notice and comment requirements.”402 Consistent with 
NFIB, though, the district court considered how the guidelines 
operated, not how the government labeled them. Looking at the post-
 
 393. 5 U.S.C. §§	553(b)(3)(A), (d)(2) (2012). 
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guidance events (including the Department of Justice’s lawsuit 
against North Carolina) and the legal effect of the guidelines, the 
district court concluded that the Departments’ interpretations “[were] 
‘compulsory in nature.’	”403 The Departments’ “Dear Colleague” 
letter expressly stated that schools “must not treat a transgender 
student differently from the way it treats other students of the same 
gender identity” and “must allow transgender students access to such 
facilities consistent with their gender identity.”404 At the hearing, the 
federal government confirmed “that schools not acting in conformity 
with Defendants’ Guidelines are not in compliance with Title IX.”405 
Consequently, the district court held that the Departments’ guidelines 
“[were], in practice, legislative rules—not just interpretations or 
policy statements because they set clear legal standards.”406 As a 
result, the APA’s notice and comment requirement applied,407 and 
the district court enjoined the Departments for failing to follow the 
procedural rules set forth in the APA.408 
The district court’s analysis demonstrates why the Departments’ 
guidance regarding transgender students constituted a new 
requirement and not simply an interpretation or clarification of Title 
IX. Given that the guidance was legislative and substantive, the 
Departments’ interpretation constituted a novel and substantive 
change to Title IX. Moreover, that new requirement was connected to 
the pre-existing Title IX funds, not additional funding that states 
could elect to accept or reject—a legislative tactic the Supreme Court 
previously deemed impermissible: 
Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds 
under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of 
health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds 
comply with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not 
free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in 
that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid 
funding.409 
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Accordingly, even if the Departments had complied with the 
APA’s notice and comment requirement (because the guidance is 
legislative in nature), their substantive guidance still would have 
violated the spending clause because the Departments would have 
been “surprising participating States with post-acceptance or 
‘retroactive conditions’	” instead of “unambiguously” imposing the 
condition at the time the Title IX moneys originally were offered to 
the states.410 
To the extent that the Departments wanted to adopt a legislative 
rule requiring school systems that maintained separate restroom and 
locker room facilities on the basis of sex to allow transgender students 
access to such facilities consistent with the students’ expressed gender 
identity, that rule would have had to have gone through the notice 
and comment requirements under the APA. But even if the 
Departments had done that, they still could not require public-school 
systems to either implement that rule or lose all existing Title IX 
moneys. Since its passage, schools have understood Title IX to allow 
for bathrooms and locker rooms to be segregated based on biological 
sex, not gender identity. Regardless of whether one agrees with the 
Departments’ proposed policy, that policy would have imposed new 
obligations on school systems across the country and threatened to 
remove all Title IX funding from schools that refused to adopt the 
policy: “[The Departments’] Guidelines and actions indicate that 
[states and school systems] jeopardize their federal education funding 
by choosing not to comply with [the] Guidelines.”411 And as NFIB 
explained, imposing such new conditions with the prospects of losing 
all pre-existing and substantial federal funding violates the spending 
clause.412 
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CONCLUSION 
H.B.	2 has been called “the most egregious, sweeping, hate-filled 
anti-LGBT legislation in this country’s history,”413 and whether true 
or not, North Carolina endured numerous repercussions from that 
perception. PayPal called off an expansion it had planned for 
Charlotte.414 Bruce Springsteen cancelled a concert.415 Jimmy Buffet 
said that his decision to continue playing in the state would depend on 
whether the law was repealed.416 The NBA moved the 2017 All-Star 
Game from Charlotte to another city.417 The NCAA decided that the 
road to the Final Four would not go through Greensboro.418 And 
perhaps most significant to a state where “ACC sports are as much a 
part of [the] culture as beach music, barbeque and bluegrass,” the 
state lost 10 neutral-site ACC championship games.419 
These are not the only voices in the public square, however. A 
small business owner in Charlotte indicated that she and her husband 
considered moving their business to South Carolina as a result of the 
Charlotte Ordinance.420 David and Jason Benham, former HGTV 
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stars and owners of a North Carolina real-estate business, lauded 
H.B.	2.421 And Franklin Graham, the leader of the Billy Graham 
Evangelistic Association, blamed the loss of major sporting events on 
Charlotte’s city council, not the North Carolina General Assembly.422 
Though the General Assembly has now repealed H.B.	2, both 
sides have decried the repeal bill,423 ensuring that public debate will 
continue—just as the Founders would have expected when they 
designed our dual system of government. H.B.	2 and laws like it 
certainly involve very difficult and sensitive issues, and debate about 
them “all too often may shade into rancor.”424 But the Constitution 
was not intended to resolve all issues such as these, nor does it permit 
the federal government to do so. In our federal system, judging the 
merits of laws like H.B.	2 does not belong to the courthouse or to the 
White House. It is a task reserved to the statehouse, where citizens, 
through their elected representatives, can “determine how best to 
form a consensus to shape the destiny of the Nation and its people.”425 
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